HOLLOW COMMITMENTS

AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES’ CLIMATE FINANCE PLANS
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Cover photo: Josh Estey - Cyclone Idai, Mozambique 2019
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Developed countries are not on track to deliver the promised USD$100 billion annually to support climate efforts in developing countries. Despite being the most responsible for the climate crisis, developed countries are failing to clearly outline how they provide scaled-up, predictable and reliable financial support to the countries that are most at risk. Furthermore, adaptation efforts in developing countries remain severely underfunded, not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of total climate finance. Failure to finance urgently needed climate action directly threatens the lives and livelihoods of millions of people across the globe. Developed countries must live up to their commitments.

At the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015, in Paris, developed countries committed to support climate efforts in developing countries by providing and mobilising at least $100 billion annually from 2020 onwards. This funding was an integral component of the global deal on climate, and failure to deliver on this promise will both undermine the implementation of the Paris Agreement and complicate future global climate negotiations.

Yet as we highlight in this report, rich countries do not have adequate plans in place to ensure that they will live up to this collective financial pledge.

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries are obliged to submit information on their planned future climate finances to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first set of these submissions were due at the end of 2020. 23 developed countries who maintain an obligation to do so, plus the European Union, have so far provided them.

CARE has analysed these reports, and the overall picture is very clear: rich countries are not providing evidence that they will meet the promised $100 billion target from 2020 onwards.

Published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in November 2020, the latest figures on international climate finance show that significantly scaled-up efforts are required from rich countries to meet the financial goal (OECD, 2020). For 2018, the most recent year covered by the figures, climate support from developed countries stood at
$78.9 billion – including mobilised private finance, export credits and non-concessional loans.

One might expect rich countries to act when more than $20 billion still needs to be found annually if they are to realise their commitments. An appropriate response would be to ensure that their recently submitted reports showed precisely how much each country would increase their own climate finance to secure their common goal.

Yet only three countries, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, put forward numbers demonstrating a planned increase in their climate finance across multiple years. As a result, the information provided by rich countries suggests that international climate finance will increase by just $1.6 billion in 2021 and 2022, compared to the amount provided in 2019. An additional five countries indicate their finances will largely remain constant in coming years, while the majority of countries provided almost no quantitative information regarding indicative future levels of support, despite this being the main purpose of the reporting.

Furthermore, no countries provided information on what they considered to be their fair share of the $100 billion, how such a number had been established, and how and when they would deliver on it.

Indicative figures and plans highlighting future climate finance are not only important to ensure that rich countries deliver on their collective obligations. This information is also vital for developing countries, as it makes it possible for them to plan for and undertake adaptation, mitigation, and resilience building actions. One cannot call on developing countries to spend significant, and often scarce, resources of their own on planning actions, when the prospect of financial commitments in support of them remains uncertain.

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, committed to by all developed countries, created a set of fundamental guidelines to ensure successful development cooperation. The Declaration underlined that predictability and commitments across multiple years are key determinants of effective support. The need for predictability in climate finance was also stressed in the decisions resulting from COP24, in 2018, which sought to clarify what information rich countries should provide in their future climate finance plans.

Yet most developed countries have failed to ensure that their overall provision of climate finance is predictable for the recipients. In addition, most developed countries also failed to ensure predictability by not clearly indicating which countries they would support in the future.

The Paris Agreement prioritises support for the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). Our analysis shows, however, that not a single rich country provides detailed quantitative information outlining the support it will provide for these most vulnerable countries, and only six countries qualitatively stated a concerted effort to preferentially support such countries.

Women and girls are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change than men and boys. The decisions of COP24 called on developed countries to provide indicative information on the gender-responsiveness of their future support. However, these details are routinely lacking, with submissions commonly dedicating just one or two sentences to the issue of mainstreaming gender within development policy.

At the global level there is a major imbalance between support for mitigation and for adaptation objectives. According to the latest OECD statistics, mitigation received more than three times the support that adaptation did in 2018. This trend has been observed for many years, despite adaptation being the overwhelming focus of climate policies in developing countries.

The Paris Agreement clearly stipulates that developed countries seek a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. It is required and expected that developed countries explicitly lay out their plans to achieve this balance, redressing uneven flows of finance to each objective. But only two countries, Ireland and New Zealand, recognise that adaptation objectives are severely underfunded and state that they will target adaptation over mitigation in the coming years. A balance between climate finance for mitigation and adaptation at the global level effectively remains out of sight.

The decisions taken at COP24 also asked developed countries to indicate how they determine their climate finance to be new and additional. The provision of new and additional finance is crucial, as diverting funds...
from tackling poverty to supporting climate activities is unjust and attributes the responsibility for action to the poorest people in the world who have not created the climate emergency.

Nevertheless, only three countries – Sweden, Norway, and Luxembourg – are providing climate finance on top of the UN commitment to provide 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance (ODA).

Our report contains a detailed analysis of all 24 submissions from the developed country Parties who state their own obligation to provide climate finance to developing countries. Each country’s submission is evaluated against five different criteria which focus on its clarity and content. Table 1 contains the results.

Luxembourg and Sweden top the table, but there is still ample room for improvement in their ex-ante climate finance reporting, with both countries only scoring around half of the possible points.

At the bottom of the table, five countries – Austria, Greece, Japan, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – received no points at all, indicating that their reports are extremely poor.

A further 11 countries obtained only a quarter, or less, of the possible points. This group comprises countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, countries which usually picture themselves as leaders in international development.

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Table 1: Scoring and ranking the biennial communication submissions of developed country Parties against five analysis criteria, assessing the information provided on future climate finance. Each criterion has been assessed against two parameters addressing the clarity and compliance of ex-ante climate finance reporting. Parties are ranked by their total score across the five criteria.
Recommendations

1. Ahead of COP26 in November 2021, developed countries should develop a clear roadmap and effort sharing agreement outlining each countries’ fair share of the $100 billion financial pledge which ensures that they collectively live up to their climate finance commitments. This should include how to achieve balance between support for adaptation and mitigation, with at least 50% of finance going to adaptation, by no later than 2023.

2. All countries, particularly large donors such as the G7 nations, should aim to at least double their public climate finance by 2025.

3. Each developed country should redouble their efforts to plan their future climate support to ensure both predictability and that the most vulnerable countries and people are prioritised.

4. The climate finance provided by developed countries should be new and additional to their commitments of official development assistance (ODA).

5. When submitting their next biennial communications on projected climate finances by the end of 2022, developed countries should ensure that they do their utmost to honour the decisions of COP24 and fully provide the requested information.
In 2009, developed country Parties to the UNFCCC committed to a goal of jointly mobilising $100 billion annually from 2020 to 2025 to address the climate change needs of developing countries. This annual sum is likely to be increased thereafter, with negotiations on a post-2025 financial target to be initiated at COP26, in Glasgow.

A central tool to track the progress of developed countries are the ex-post biennial reports. In parallel, Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement recognised the importance of transparent information outlining future provisions of financial support. Through decision 12/CMA.1, taken at COP24, developed country Parties were requested to submit 15 “types of information”, which detailed indicative quantitative and qualitative information on their projected levels of support to be provided to developing country Parties.¹

The overarching aim of these submissions is to increase the clarity, predictability and efficiency of support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This ex-ante climate finance reporting is provided in biennial communications which are hosted on a dedicated online portal by the UNFCCC, and will be compiled into a synthesis report by the Secretariat during 2021 to inform the Global Stocktake (GST).² Developed country Parties agreed to submit these biennial communications by the end of 2020, providing enhanced information regarding their climate finance for the coming years. The submissions were intended to add detail to the discussions running up to the following year’s COP negotiations, and will therefore contribute to the discussions at COP26, in November 2021.

The political importance of the ex-ante reporting must also be interpreted from a perspective which acknowledges that developed countries have consistently pushed back on the developing countries’ demands to have climate finance plans be reported in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with developed countries pointing to other instruments

¹ The Annex of this report contains reproductions of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement alongside decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.

² Ex-ante Climate Finance information post-2020: https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/ex-ante-climate-finance-information-post-2020-article-95-of-the-paris-agreement
being available for outlining future climate finance contributions.

Due to the urgent need for rapidly scaled-up provisions of financial support for climate action and the ongoing negotiations surrounding long-term climate finance, it is important that these biennial communications are assessed with regard to their content and compliance with the commitments made under the UNFCCC. The objective of this report is to analyse, critique and rank these submissions, and to determine if they live up to the content and spirit of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement and other relevant commitments under the Convention.

With this work, CARE seeks to contribute to transparency by facilitating an increased understanding of the varying levels of performance and ambition of the developed countries, and also to make the case for new and increased finance pledges leading up to 2025. Vulnerable developing countries are already suffering from the impacts of the climate crisis. Governments in developing countries have a responsibility to set frameworks to enhance the resilience of their citizens to the impacts of climate change, but because climate change has been caused primarily by the Global North, poorer countries are entitled to financial support allowing them to do so.

Two core demands from CARE are that financial support must be based on the obligations of developed countries as enshrined in the Convention, ensuring that at least 50% of climate finance is allocated towards adaptation, and that gender equality and women’s empowerment are promoted across climate finance. As many of the impacts of climate change will continue to exceed people’s ability to adapt, due to the inadequacy of current and projected emissions reductions measures, CARE also sees the need for additional resources to address the growing loss and damage that developing countries face. This is a problem which is not yet systematically reflected in the UNFCCC finance discussions.

Requests for Annex II Parties to provide ex-ante information on development finance are not new. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and subsequent Accra Agenda for Action recognised that developed countries were failing to provide predictable aid flows, and therefore required developed countries to provide “reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework” (OECD, 2005; 2008). In 2011, an OECD commissioned review of the information that developed countries had provided, and actions they had taken, found that progress towards ensuring predictability had been slow (Woods et al., 2011). Since 2011, the Declaration's monitoring mechanism has not been maintained by wealthy donors. It is important to now determine whether recently submitted biennial communications have addressed these previous shortcomings.

To present the results of this assessment, Section 1 gives a summary of the information provided in biennial communications with regard to both the clarity and compliance of all 24 assessed submissions, while Section 2 presents and analyses the key information included in each developed country Party’s submissions in turn.
In this report, biennial communications have been assessed against five criteria, created to explore their adherence to existing UNFCCC commitments and the quality and detail of the submissions. The criteria assess the submitted information against the 15 “types of information” (a-o) outlined in the Annex to decision 12.CMA.1, concerning Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. The “types of information” relevant to each criterion are included in parentheses after their definitions, in the boxes below. The criteria specifically explore the detail provided on projected levels of future climate finance, as information on past provisions can already be found in various other sources, including the biennial reports.

“Future level of support”: The Paris Agreement reiterated the commitments of developed country Parties to provide and mobilise $100bn of climate finance annually through the provision of scaled-up financial resources, and to clearly report on their ex-post provisions biennially. Alongside this, Article 9.5 of the Agreement states that developed countries shall communicate information regarding their projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. The first assessment criterion, “future level of support”, assesses whether Annex II Parties comply with these commitments to provide enhanced, ex-ante information on future provisions of climate finance with a clarity able to ensure the predictability of support for developing countries.

“Balance between adaptation and mitigation support”: Current estimates produced by the OECD suggest that developed countries provided and mobilised just $16.8bn of adaptation finance in 2018, and that the adaptation share of international climate finance provisions between 2016-2018 was only 19% (OECD, 2020). Furthermore, while decision 12.CMA.1 recognises that developed countries must take into account the need for public, grant-based support for adaptation, the use of loans to deliver adaptation finance increased over the same period. The second assessment criterion, “balance between adaptation and mitigation support”, acknowledges this historic imbalance, and addresses the commitments made in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement, that “the provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation”.

“The most vulnerable”: Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement outlines that in addition to being balanced, any provisions of climate finance must consider “country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those...”
that are particularly vulnerable”. The third criterion, “the most vulnerable”, acknowledges Article 7.5 and 7.6 of the Agreement, and aims to assess the extent to which developing country ownership of interventions, vulnerability, and gender-responsiveness has been considered in the indicative information provided.

“Additionality”: For developing country Parties, the costs of climate change are additional to the costs of development. Commitments made in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreement therefore stipulated that climate finance should be scaled-up and new and additional, while Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement requires that climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts. For developing country Parties, clear and meaningful definitions of additionality can help prevent increased climate finances displacing ODA provisions, and thus increasing the predictability of both. The fourth criterion, “additionality”, assesses how developed country Parties have defined additionality, and whether the definition is adequate.

“Mobilisation of further resources”: Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement states developed country Parties should “continue to take the lead in mobilising climate finance from a wide variety of sources”, with actions representing a progression beyond previous efforts. In addition, Article 2.1.c states all financial flows must be “consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”. The final criterion, “mobilisation of further resources”, addresses the mobilisation of further financial resources, in particular from private sources.
CRITERIA:

1 **Future level of support**: Does the Party provide enhanced information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on projects, programmes, and recipient countries? (a, b, c)
   - Does the Party provide indicative, quantitative information on projected future climate finance figures across multiple years?
   - Does the Party provide annual or multiannual totals ensuring that the Party will provide its fair share of significantly scaled-up finances towards the $100bn goal?
   - Does the Party provide comprehensive information clearly showing how these projected finances will be apportioned? Including regarding recipient countries, projects and programmes?

2 **Balance between adaptation and mitigation support**: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation in this future support? (d, j)
   - Does the Party recognise that present provisions of global public climate finance are significantly imbalanced, and that more adaptation finance must be provided to redress this global imbalance?
   - Does the Party provide information on balanced provisions with explicit reference to projected future climate finances, and not simply regarding previous provisions of climate finance?
   - Does the Party provide information responding to the need for public grant-based support for adaptation purposes?

3 **The most vulnerable**: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and provide clarity on gender responsiveness and beneficiaries in future provisions of climate finance? (c, j, l)
   - Does the Party clearly explain how their future provisions of climate finance will target the most vulnerable, including information on the finance to be allocated to the LDCs and SIDS?
   - Does the Party provide information on how they will ensure gender responsiveness in their future climate finances?

4 **Additionality**: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? (f, n)
   - Does the Party make use of a definition of additionality which is in line with both the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC?
   - Does the Party provide safeguards to ensure that their future provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of official development assistance?

5 **Mobilisation of further resources**: Has the party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilience? (k, m)
   - Does the Party provide information showing how its future provisions of climate finance will adhere to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement?
PARAMETERS:

For each criterion submissions are scored against two parameters, A and B, outlined below.

Total scores for each Party, and average scores for each criterion and parameter, have been calculated and presented in Table 1, allowing the biennial communications to be ranked:

### A. Clarity of information

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<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The submission does not provide clear information addressing the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The submission provides clear information addressing the majority of the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The submission provides clear information addressing all the requests in decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
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</table>

### B. Compliance with commitments

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The information submitted does not evidence compliance with the content or spirit of commitments of relevance to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The information submitted evidences partial compliance with the content and spirit of commitments of relevance to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The information submitted fully complies with the content and spirit of commitments of relevance to decision 12/CMA.1 and its Annex.</td>
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33 biennial communications were submitted to the UNFCCC by the end of February 2021. Of these, 11 were provided by non-Annex II Parties who are not formally obliged to provide support to developing country Parties, as outlined in Article 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 of the Convention. Despite this, two non-Annex II Parties, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, stated a strong commitment towards the goal of jointly mobilising $100 billion annually, and they have been included in the assessments. This report therefore comprises an analysis of 24 submissions including 21 Annex II Parties who maintain obligations to provide climate-related support to developing countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the European Commission.

In addition to the biennial communication submitted by the European Union (EU), containing the submissions from individual Member States, Annex II submissions were also received from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK). However, Iceland and the United States (US) did not provide biennial communication submissions, despite their obligation to do so. These two Parties have not fulfilled their commitment to provide indicative quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of public climate finances to be provided to developing country Parties. In absence of a formal submission, this report includes an informal and unscored analysis of the US International Climate Finance Plan announced at the April 2021 Leaders Summit on Climate (The White House, 2021).

The International Climate Finance Plan pledges to double US provisions of public climate finance, and to triple adaptation finance, by 2024, relative to average amounts provided in the second half of the fiscal year period 2013-2016. This works out as approximately $5.7 billion and $1.5 billion in climate and adaptation finance, respectively, by 2024 (World Resource Institute, 2021). The plan does not commit to providing parity between support for adaptation and mitigation objectives, and it does not indicate the projects, programmes, and

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1 Non-Annex II Parties to submit biennial communications: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Monaco.

2 It should be noted that the information provided by the European Commission in its submission regarding the EU budget/NDICI was still under negotiation at the moment of the European Commission’s submission. A political agreement was reached in December 2020 and the NDICI is expected to come into force in the summer of 2021.
recipient countries to be financed or how support will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable. However, a more detailed US Agency for International Development (USAID) Climate Change Strategy is to be released at COP26, in November 2021.

It is important to acknowledge that the EU’s common submission contains a shared chapter alongside the biennial communications from individual Member States. This shared chapter provides aggregate trends and figures describing the EU and its Member States’ climate and adaptation finances over the last decade, alongside qualitative information regarding the mobilisation of private finance. In addition, the common chapter provides information outlining efforts in support of capacity building and technology transfer activities, as well as shared policy positions surrounding, for example, Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. However, our report focuses on the ability of biennial communications to enhance the predictability of future climate finance from a developing country perspective, and therefore it is the clarity and compliance of information describing indicative national finance flows which is of interest. Despite being included for context, where relevant, the common elements of the EU biennial communication have not been found to contribute to the scores of individual Member States within this analysis.

Ultimately, the quality, clarity, and completeness of ex-ante climate finance reporting in biennial communications is poor. No Party has come close to complying with the five assessment criteria of this analysis. Even the highest-rated submissions are far from providing a holistic picture of those donors’ annual future provisions of climate finance. In addition, Parties responsible for large volumes of climate finance, such as Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria and Spain, have failed to provide substantive detail in their indicative quantitative figures. The majority of these Parties provided little more than information relating to multiyear commitments to institutions such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), much of which had already been announced.

The information submitted by all the assessed donors has fallen well short of providing the predictability and enhanced information requested in Article 9.5 and it fails to clearly describe the finances to be provided by donors in the coming years, or that they will be scaled-up. The indicative information provided by wealthy countries does not give certainty that the collective goal to provide and mobilise $100 billion will be reached in 2020, or in the years thereafter.

Table 2, below, presents the results from the analysis of the five criteria outlined in the methodology. The results highlight that the submissions fail to comply with the spirit and content of Article 9.5. The submissions can be broadly placed into three groups:

(1) Submissions which provide quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of financial resources for climate action in developing countries. This information evidences that the Party’s climate finance will increase in the coming years and is provided in enough detail to outline annual totals across multiple years. Yet the information provided in this group often lacks clarity and completeness when specifying recipients, projects and programmes to be funded. Furthermore, despite the projections and estimated future totals, the information provided does not explain how finances will amount to the Party’s fair share of the $100 billion goal. To a certain degree, the submissions in this group attempt to outline plans showing: how private-sector finance will be mobilised in the future, that the provided finance will target the most vulnerable, and that finances will be balanced between mitigation and adaptation. Yet no Party in this group has addressed these criteria comprehensively. This group consists of three Parties: Luxembourg, New Zealand and the UK.

(2) Submissions which do not show that a Party’s finance will be scaled-up beyond past efforts or that finances will amount to the Party’s fair share of the $100 billion goal, despite offering some quantitative and qualitative information regarding their future climate finance. The indicative information provided is in enough detail to evidence annual totals across multiple years, yet the biennial communications in this group state that a Party’s climate finance will remain constant in the coming years at best. Like the submissions above, the information provided often lacks clarity and completeness when specifying recipients, projects and programmes to be funded. This group consists of five Parties: Sweden, Ireland, Australia, Switzerland, and France; alongside the European Commission.

(3) Biennial communications within this group provide much less detail concerning future provisions of climate finance. The submissions in this group do not present clear and detailed quantitative information outlining annual climate finance projections across multiple
years. Some submissions provide information on the climate finance to be provided in 2021, or information regarding past provisions of climate finance, and therefore contribute little regarding the predictability of support for developing countries. For most submissions in this group, the indicative information provided is restricted to presenting a selection of financial commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF, or simpler assertions concerning the likelihood of financial support being maintained or increased in the coming years. Much of this information cannot be considered enhanced, as developing country Parties will be aware of such commitments from Fourth Biennial Report (BR4) submissions to the UNFCCC among other more recent announcements. The submissions in this group, with the exception of Norway, fail to outline definitions of additionality in line with the spirit of the UNFCCC and so fail to outline how future provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA. This group consists of 15 Parties: Finland, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Portugal, Spain, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Japan and Slovakia.

Only the biennial communications from Luxembourg and Sweden present definitions of “new and additional” finance which are in line with the content and spirit of the UNFCCC. In doing so, these two Parties define new and additional climate finance as finance over a baseline of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA.

Furthermore, it is notable that only eight Parties (Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and the UK) have acknowledged the scope of Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, which addresses all international financial flows, not just climate and development finance. Even fewer have provided information outlining actions to make their domestic financial flows consistent with the long-term goals of the Agreement. One of the most detailed and far-reaching commitments, that of Luxembourg, commits to convert just one fifth of the country’s financial flows into “green flows” by 2025. Annex II Parties are only requested to provide information showing how their international climate finance (provided and mobilised support) is helping developing countries in their efforts to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. This is inadequate, principally because it is the non-developmental, domestic and international financial flows of the Annex II Parties themselves which are jeopardising these endeavours.

The “future level of support” criterion explores whether the biennial communications provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, and includes whether information on the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be supported has been provided. This analysis finds that there are, in general, four levels of detail being provided in the submissions:

→ Parties such as Luxembourg, New Zealand and the UK evidence that their climate finances are likely to significantly increase above past totals.

→ Parties such as Sweden, Ireland, Australia, Switzerland and France, alongside the European Commission, have provided quantitative projections of their annual climate finance covering multiple years or simpler multiannual projections.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Future level of support</th>
<th>Balanced adaptation, mitigation</th>
<th>The most vulnerable</th>
<th>Additionality</th>
<th>Mobilization of further resources</th>
<th>Total score (0-20)</th>
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Table 2: Scoring and ranking the biennial communication submissions of developed country Parties with regard to five analysis criteria, assessing the information provided on future climate finance. Each criterion is assessed against parameters addressing the clarity and compliance of ex-ante climate finance reporting. Parties are ranked by the total score received across the five criteria.
The information provided shows these Parties’ finance is likely to remain constant in coming years.

- Parties such as Finland, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Spain, Austria and Japan have not provided explicit annual projections of climate finance across multiple years. These submissions rely on highlighting a selection of multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as examples of future support, and broader assertions concerning the likelihood of financial support being maintained or increased in the coming years, without detailed supporting quantitative information.

- Parties such as Portugal, the Czech Republic, Greece and Slovakia have not provided any information, qualitative or quantitative, concerning projected levels of climate finance to be provided in the coming years.

In the context and spirit of Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, no Party provided adequate levels of information and clarity on their future climate finance provisions, particularly regarding a holistic picture of the recipient countries, projects and programmes to be funded. Ultimately, the submissions do not adequately enhance the predictability of climate finance or suggest that developed country pledges will be met in the near future. Most notable is the reliance of most Parties on merely outlining a selection of multiyear financial commitments to specific multilateral funds without adequate additional detail. These Parties therefore only provide a fragmented picture of the climate finance to be expected in developing countries.

Regarding the “balance between adaptation and mitigation support” criterion, the information provided in biennial communication submissions, alongside ex-post climate finance reporting, indicates that Parties conceptualise and act upon the “balance” stipulated in Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement in four broad ways:

- Parties who support the notion of providing balance in their future climate finances while recognising that adaptation objectives are severely underfunded. These Parties state that they will target adaptation over mitigation in an attempt to redress this imbalance, and they include Ireland, and New Zealand.

- Parties who consider balance to mean near-parity between adaptation and mitigation finance totals, who have a track record of providing their finance as such, and who state they will continue to provide balance in the future. These Parties include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, alongside the European Commission.

- Parties whose definition of balance appears unclear or inconsistent (for example, by referring to balanced bilateral finances without reference to multilateral provisions) and who have not provided balanced climate finances in the past, such as Germany, Japan, and Spain.

- Parties who do not refer to balance and who have not provided balanced finance in the past, including Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Norway and Slovakia.

As the majority of Parties do not provide detailed information on their future provisions of climate finance, they are unable to evidence that their finances will be balanced. Only two Parties, Ireland and New Zealand, recognise the need for rapidly scaled-up adaptation finance, and state that they will target adaptation over mitigation in the coming years. Four of the largest climate finance providers to report biennial communications, France, Germany, Japan and Norway, either do not refer to balance, or refer to it only with regard to a portion of their finance. Due to the extent to which adaptation finance lags mitigation finance, and the tendency of multilateral and private climate finance to tend towards the latter, the information provided by Annex II Parties does not evidence that imbalances between adaptation and mitigation finance will be redressed.

The analysis of “the most vulnerable” criterion addresses whether Annex II Parties provide information evidencing that their future finances will support developing country-driven strategies, and whether they will prioritise the most vulnerable (in particular through gender-responsive support and through support targeting LDCs and SIDS. Again, no Party has provided detailed quantitative information regarding this criterion, yet four groups emerged in the analysis:

- Parties who qualitatively state a concerted effort
to preferentially support the most vulnerable, including women, LDCs and SIDS and who have a track record of doing so, including Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and the UK.

→ Parties who acknowledge the unique needs of the most vulnerable, including women, LDCs and SIDS, and state that they have integrated support for them into their climate support, including the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden, alongside the European Commission.

→ Parties including Austria, France, Japan, Germany and Norway, who acknowledge the unique needs of the most vulnerable, including women, LDCs and SIDS, but whose climate-related development finance has previously provided below average levels of support to such nations.

→ Parties who do not provide any information acknowledging the unique needs of the most vulnerable, including Greece, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

In general, despite the issue being acknowledged in some biennial communications, details to show the gender-responsiveness of climate support is routinely lacking, with submissions commonly dedicating one or two sentences to the issue of mainstreaming gender in development policy.

The “additionality” criterion assesses the information provided by Parties concerning how they determine their climate finances to be new and additional. Annex II Parties have here used a variety of definitions, but the vast majority consider climate finance to be new and additional so long as it was not included in any prior year’s reporting:

→ In the context of annual climate finance figures, most biennial communications consider all climate finance to be new and additional so long as it has not been previously reported. These Parties include Australia, the UK, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Canada, Japan, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, alongside the European Commission.

→ Two Parties consider climate finances to be new and additional so long as provisions of ODA are increasing year on year, including Austria and New Zealand.

→ Finland considers climate finance above the levels provided in the baseline year of 2009 to be new and additional.

→ Sweden and Luxembourg consider only finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA to be new and additional.

→ Norway fails to define additionality within its biennial communication, yet commits to providing 1% of GNI as ODA.

Only the biennial communications from Sweden and Luxembourg provide any information indicating that climate and development finances are considered mutually exclusive. No other Party explicitly indicates how their provisions of climate finance avoid displacing ODA. The submission from Belgium conceptualises additionality in various ways when describing various portions of its climate finance. However, how much of Belgium’s climate finance is truly additional to its broader provision of ODA is unclear.

The final criterion, “mobilisation of further resources”, assesses whether Parties provide information outlining clear plans to mobilise further private-sector resources, and how finances are consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience. The detail of information on mobilisation plans varies significantly between the submissions. Parties such as Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, the UK, Australia and Norway, alongside the European Commission, provide details concerning their future plans and the financial instruments and channels which will be used to engage with the private sector. However, most Parties’ biennial communications focus on the ways in which private finance has already been mobilised, and lack clear, detailed indications showing the future direction of their strategy. Parties without detailed plans include France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Canada, Japan, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Switzerland. Greece and Portugal fail to provide any substantive information on mobilised private finance.
Luxembourg

Luxembourg’s biennial communication provides some indicative information regarding the Party’s future provisions of climate finance. The submission outlines a quantitative multiyear commitment to provide 200 million EUR of new and additional climate finance from 2021-2025, an increase from the 120 million EUR committed from 2014-2020. However, little detailed information is presented regarding the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded, or how they will target the most vulnerable, hampering the enhanced predictability and clarity of future support. In addition, only a single sentence is included concerning gender-responsiveness. The submission commits to parity between mitigation and adaptation support, but provides no quantitative or qualitative information to show how it will be achieved. Most of Luxembourg’s past climate finances have been reported as cross-cutting in nature, meaning changes in reporting practices would be needed to accurately determine the split of any future provisions between adaptation and mitigation objectives. Information has been provided to indicate that the Party’s provisions of climate finance will be in excess of the 1% of GNI provided as ODA, and therefore can be considered new and additional.
Criteria | Information provided
---|---
**Future level of support:** Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:** Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

| A. 1 | B. 1 |

**The most vulnerable:** Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**Additionality:** Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

| A. 2 | B. 2 |

**Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

| A. 1 | B. 1 |

Luxembourg provides some qualitative and 1 quantitative information on the projected levels of new and additional financial resources that they expect to provide for climate action in developing countries: “After 2020, Luxembourg will continue to support developing countries in the fight against climate change. In this regard, an [International Climate Finance] budget of 200 million euros will be available for the period from 2021 to 2025.” This commitment is further broken down into annual allocations, and it represents an increase from the 120 million EUR committed from 2014-2020. Regarding programming, reference is made to the ICF’s strategy document: “Attribution des fonds pour le financement international de la lutte contre le changement climatique.” The information provided does not provide complete clarity on how much finance the proposed recipients will receive, or complete information on the specific projects or programmes which will be funded. Luxembourg’s strategy does refer to its partner countries, including: Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Laos, Nicaragua and Cabo Verde. However, from a recipient country perspective predictability has not been substantively enhanced in the submission.

Luxembourg’s submission states that new and additional finance “aims to provide balanced support to mitigation (40%), adaptation (40%) and REDD+ (20%).” However, in its biennial reports to the UN, Luxembourg reports the vast majority of its climate-related finance to be cross-cutting in nature, without clear information regarding the split of these finances between adaptation and mitigation. This particularly true of the new and additional portions of Luxembourg’s climate finances. Much of the cross-cutting finance provided by Luxembourg is not grant based.

Concerning developing country-driven strategies, Luxembourg’s development programming uses five main selection criteria to allocate its International Climate Finance, one of which is “National priority, political will, need of beneficiaries.” On gender-responsiveness, the submission states: “A special focus is put on the gender component during project evaluation,” yet further detail is lacking. It should be noted that new gender and environmental strategies are currently in preparation. On targeting vulnerability, Luxembourg’s adaptation finance specifically notes LDCs and SIDS as key recipients. The LDC and SIDS shares of Luxembourg’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 were approximately 80% and 6% respectively, far exceeding developed country averages. Yet, importantly, as no recipients are explicitly referenced with regard to Luxembourg’s future climate finance provisions, no enhanced, indicative information has been provided at the project level. No quantitative information has been provided to show how and to what degree climate finances will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.

Luxembourg defines new and additional finance as follows: “New and additional’ means that the resources that Luxembourg commits to deliver are not taken over from earlier commitments and are thus ‘new’. ‘Additional’ means that they come ‘on top of’ Luxembourg’s ODA commitments and thus are not ‘double counted’ or draining on other resources dedicated to poverty eradication”. Furthermore, the information provided states that additionality will be ensured in future finances: “As stated in the 2018-2023 Governmental Programme: Luxembourg will continue to apply the ‘additionality’ of funds mobilised for international climate financing.”

Concerning the mobilisation of private finance, the submission refers to Luxembourg’s 2018 Sustainable Finance Roadmap, and its forthcoming revision, stating that: “Luxembourg’s [International Climate Finance] strategy will be oriented towards existing and new financial instruments... and leverage new and additional funding, including from private sources” and “its green finance commitment to convert 20% of the country’s finance flows into green flows by 2025.” However, no indicative, quantitative information has been provided which estimates the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Luxembourg’s public support, or the particular objectives of the finance. This report does acknowledge that such detail is hard to provide regarding the mobilisation of private finance.

In addition, the submission states that Luxembourg’s provisions are in accordance with the objectives of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, including making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions, and climate-resilient development. However, further details outlining how they are in accordance are not provided.
Sweden

Sweden’s biennial communication provides little enhanced information to ensure the predictability of their future financial support for climate activities in developing countries. While the submission does reiterate an existing commitment of 6.5 billion SEK from 2018-2022, the earmarked finance is not entirely climate focused and no indicative ex-ante climate finance figures are presented alongside. Sweden does provide information evidencing that its provisions of climate finance are in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA and are therefore new and additional. A core component of Sweden’s submission highlights that all financial support takes developing country priorities as a point of departure, and therefore no explicit commitments are included in support of balanced mitigation and adaptation finance or the prioritisation of the most vulnerable. However, in the past Sweden have shown high support for adaptation, LDCs, and grant shares within climate finance totals, alongside a high degree of gender-responsiveness.
### Criteria

#### Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

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#### Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

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#### The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

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#### Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

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#### Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

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**Information provided**

Statements in Sweden’s biennial communication provide some indicative qualitative and quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for action on environmental sustainability, sustainable climate and oceans, and sustainable use of natural resources in developing countries: “The Strategy for Sweden’s global development cooperation in the areas of environmental sustainability, sustainable climate and oceans, and sustainable use of natural resources 2018-2022 sets aside 6.5 billion SEK for the period.” However, Sweden committed over 6 billion SEK of climate-specific finance in 2018 alone, and therefore this indicative information does not provide a complete picture of the Party’s future finances. The information provided does note that the amounts that will be provided for climate action depend upon the requests and dialogues initiated by developing countries. Concerning information on programmes and recipients, however, detail is lacking: “Priority countries are those developing countries that prioritise climate action.” Additional information on multiyear commitments are also outlined in the submission, but the information is incomplete, and does not outline a holistic picture of future Swedish climate finance. Where it does, the projected finances are not compliant with Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement regarding scaled-up resources.

There are no assurances provided stating that Sweden will ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation. Instead, Sweden focuses on the responsiveness of its financial provisions to the desire of the recipient country, who maintains a high degree of ownership over the funding. Yet the adaptation shares of the climate finance reported in 2017 and 2018 through Sweden’s Fourth Biennial Report were significantly larger than the mitigation and cross-cutting shares. All of Sweden’s past adaptation support has been grant-based, although the submission lacks detail and clarity concerning future support.

Country-driven strategies are outlined as a fundamental element of Swedish developmental and climate support, and it is stated that this will remain the case with future support. The submission states: “Our development cooperation takes developing countries priorities as a point of departure. We continue to stand ready to support developing countries who effectively outline their needs and priorities.” Furthermore, despite vulnerability not being mentioned in the submission, the LDC share of the Swedish climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 was approximately 34%, significantly over developed country averages. On gender-responsiveness, the biennial communication states: “Almost all of [the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency’s] climate finance is gender responsive.” Sweden voluntarily reports on the gender-responsiveness of its climate finance to the EU in Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR) reporting, and gender is key to umbrella development and climate policy in Sweden. Yet no recipients (or income groupings) are explicitly referenced with regard to Sweden’s future climate finance provisions, and no enhanced, indicative information has been provided at the project level. No quantitative information has been provided showing how and to what degree climate finances will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.

Sweden defines new and additional climate finance as that which has not been reported in previous years and is over the 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA: “Sweden has long stated that our climate finance is new and additional, since the finance we provide is additional to the UN 0.7 percent target.” The information provided by Sweden considers climate finance and ODA to be mutually exclusive flows.

Information is included stating public financial resources will continue to mobilise private finance: “[The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency] works with a number of instruments to mobilise additional finance, such as guarantees. We are also promoting such an approach in our multilateral development cooperation such as the development banks, including the Swedish development finance institution Swedfund.” However, no indicative, quantitative information has been provided regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised, or the countries in which these activities will take place. Concerning finance compatible with Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, the submission states: “We support countries in enhancing and implementing their Nationally Determined Contributions.”
New Zealand

The overall impression of New Zealand’s submission is that while some indicative quantitative and qualitative information has been provided, the biennial communication does not provide longer-term predictability and clarity for recipient countries. The scope of the information provided is limited, with projected climate finance figures extending only up to 2022. In addition, the submission provides no clear evidence of consistently and significantly scaled-up efforts, or of a meaningful definition of additionality. The information provided does include a commitment towards balance between mitigation and adaptation, and that grant-based support, vulnerability, and gender form core concerns in providing support, with two-thirds of future finances to target high vulnerability SIDS.
### Information provided

New Zealand’s biennial communication provides some qualitative and quantitative information on indicative annual projections of climate finance up to 2022. The submission states New Zealand “is indicatively programmed to spend around NZ$10.7 million for climate related activities.” Annual indicative projections of NZ$109, NZ$174, and NZ$116 million will be provided in 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively, with 78% to be provided bilaterally and 22% multilaterally. These indicative pledges evidence an increase in future climate finance provisions. However, due to economic uncertainties more assertive climate finance commitments total only NZ$300 million over the same period, which does not represent an assurance of significantly scaled-up climate finance provisions. The submission does provide some details concerning programming, but a detailed, long-term, holistic breakdown of future finances concerning specific recipient countries and projects is lacking.

### Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 1**

### Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 2**

### The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 1**

### Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

- **A. 0**
- **B. 0**

### Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

- **A. 0**
- **B. 1**

Concerning balanced provisions of climate finance, the submission includes a firm pledge to preferentially support adaptation activities: “New Zealand has expressly committed to ensuring at least 50% of its climate change-related support is provided for adaptation initiatives. This commitment recognises the importance of adaptation support to SIDS, particularly in the Pacific.” The submission further adds: “For 2019-2022 we indicatively forecast that we will spend NZ$223 million on adaptation activities, NZ$50 million on mitigation activities, and NZ$237 million on cross-cutting initiatives.”

Regarding support for developing country-driven strategies, New Zealand’s biennial communication highlights that: “National and community-level resilience and adaptation actions are implemented within the context of national and regional plans, strategies and frameworks. New Zealand works with partner countries and regional agencies to help shape and deliver these actions in response to countries’ priorities.” In addition, the submission commits to providing two-thirds of climate finances to highly vulnerable Pacific SIDS and to “a secondary geographic focus on Southeast Asia, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs),” although information is lacking on specific recipients and projects to be funded. The LDC and SIDS shares of the climate-related development finance provided by New Zealand to the OECD in 2017-2018 were approximately 20% and 58% respectively, both far above developed country averages. Concerning gender-responsive climate finances, the submission states that New Zealand’s approach to inclusive development focuses on, among other things, “advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment, and child and youth well-being.”

New Zealand’s biennial communication submission states: “We consider increased climate-related support within the context of a growing ODA budget ‘new and additional’ finance.” This definition of additionality does not live up to the spirit of the commitments made under the UNFCCC, as it does not provide safeguards to prevent increases in climate finance deriving from displaced ODA provisions.

The biennial communication provides examples of publicly funded climate projects which have mobilised private-sector finance in the past, with a focus on renewable energy support in the Pacific. However, the information provided does not resemble a clear plan to mobilise further resources in the future, or to provide indicative quantitative information on the amounts expected to be mobilised.

Regarding financial flows consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states increasing support for: “Long term low-emissions development strategies”, “National and sub-national adaptation planning” and “Implementation of NDCs through support for the Pacific Regional NDC Hub and bilateral activities including renewable energy.”
Finland

The biennial communication submitted by Finland provides limited information enhancing the predictability of the country's scaled-up future climate finance for developing countries. Aside from some multiyear commitments extended to multilateral institutions, the submission includes no indicative quantitative information on future totals, and extremely limited information regarding the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded. Finland's biennial communication includes a weak statement towards balanced support for mitigation and adaptation objectives, but has not historically provided clear information to show a record of doing so. While Finland uses a more stringent definition of additionality than most developed countries, in only considering climate finance above a 2009 baseline as additional, there appear to be no safeguards to prevent increases in climate finance displacing ODA.
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<th>Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td>Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?</td>
<td>Finland has only provided information regarding a selection of multiyear commitments, and so the submission provides no enhanced, indicative and quantitative information on projected levels of future public financial resources. Due to the use of annual budgets, enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes, has not been provided. Concerning information on programmes and recipient countries, the Finnish biennial communication states: “Finland focuses its support to LDCs and fragile states,” yet no explicit information is included on future recipients of climate finance provisions.</td>
<td>A. 0</td>
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<td>Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?</td>
<td>Concerning balance, the information provided is weakly phrased: “During the last ten years often the ratio between adaptation and mitigation has been quite near to 50:50 balance,” and “This broad picture is not expected to change in the future.” However, Finland’s Fourth Biennial Report shows that in 2017 and 2018, Finland provided less adaptation finance than mitigation finance, and most finances were reported as cross-cutting, with the actual objective split unknown. No detailed plan ensuring balance within the new financial commitment is provided. The vast majority of Finland’s climate finance is grant-based.</td>
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<td>The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?</td>
<td>Concerning vulnerability, the information provided says that Finland prioritises LDCs and fragile states. However, only around 13% of the Finnish climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 targeted the LDCs, which is below developed country averages. Once again, specific recipients were not referred to with regard to Finland’s new financial commitments. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: “Finland follows the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by donor and partner developing countries, which stresses the ownership and alignment of the partner country in development cooperation.” Gender equality is referred to as both a long-standing component, and an established cross-cutting component, of the Finnish development strategy.</td>
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<td>Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?</td>
<td>The Finnish definition of additionality states that all finance above that which was provided in a baseline year (2009; EUR 26.8 million) is considered new and additional. Despite ensuring a degree of additionality by referencing to a specific baseline, this does not avoid climate finance displacing ODA. It is unclear whether the Finnish conceptualisation of new and additional finance includes safeguards to prevent this.</td>
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<td>Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?</td>
<td>Concerning the information provided in support of plans to mobilise further private-sector finance, the Finnish biennial communication outlines Finnfund and Finnpartnership as of particular importance. Finnfund is stated to provide risk capital, while Finnpartnership creates links between businesses. Through the investment funding budget line (on top of ODA budget lines), the submission states: “During 2020-23 about 500 million euros will be invested out of which at least 75 per cent will be channeled into climate change related investments.” The commitment made is therefore the same as the commitment made by Finland in 2015, and does not represent increased provisions of climate finance through this channel. Concerning the provision of financial flows consistent with low emissions and climate resilience, the submission indicates that Article 2.1.c and low-emissions development have become a consideration in broader Finnish economic activities through the Party’s engagement with the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action: “The Coalition will help countries to design and implement climate policies at national level, and consider coordinated actions at regional and global level. The key objective of the Coalition is to bring climate considerations into the mainstream of economic policy.”</td>
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Ireland

Ireland’s submission provides limited quantitative or qualitative information to enhance the predictability of its support, committing only to maintain the level of climate finance seen in 2018 for the remainder of the current Government. Little information is provided to indicate how this finance will be channelled, or which projects and programmes are to be funded. The biennial communication does evidence that adaptation and gender-responsive actions in highly vulnerable countries have been, and will be, prioritised over mitigation objectives through predominantly grant-based support. However, while Ireland commits to doubling the share of climate finance within its ODA provisions, the submission also indicates all public climate finance is considered as new and additional, as it has not been reported in previous years. From a recipient country perspective, such a definition of additionality does not protect against increases in Irish climate finance displacing ODA.
### Criteria

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### Information provided

Information provided in Ireland’s biennial communication offers some details on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries: “The Programme for Government (issued in mid-2020) commits to at least doubling the percentage of ODA that counts as climate finance, with absolute levels to not dip below that of 2019. This means that this is a firm commitment of the current Government.” For 2021 and the remaining years of this Government we can commit to a minimum of €80 million in international climate finance annually.” Effectively, the quantitative information included only maintains current levels of provisions. Concerning recipient countries: “The vast majority of bilateral climate finance goes to Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Malawi. Ireland also prioritises contributions to the LDCF [Least Developed Countries Fund], activities of the LEG [Least Developed Country Expert Group], and the new LDC initiative LIFE-AR, all of which is spent in LDCs.” Information regarding the recipients of any future provisions of climate finance are not clearly outlined in the submission, although these documents are said to be forthcoming.

Information provided in the submission shows a strong focus on adaptation in climate finance provisions and demonstrates that this will continue: “In the last two years less than 5% of Irish climate finance has been mitigation only”; “As a matter of policy, Ireland’s priority is grant resources to support adaptation for LDCs and SIDS.” Considering the dominance of mitigation finance in international totals, Irish support is stated as attempting to redress this imbalance. In 2017 and 2018, in its Fourth Biennial Report, the Irish climate finance reported targeting adaptation over mitigation. Irish adaptation support is grant-based.

The information provided by Ireland has a strong focus on LDCs and SIDS: “As a matter of policy, Ireland’s priority is grant resources to support adaptation for LDCs and SIDS, and all our funding instruments have capacity development and country ownership at their heart.” Concerning developing country-led strategies, the submission notes that all Irish cooperation is guided by the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness. From 2017-2018, approximately 81% of the Irish climate-related development finance that was reported to the OECD targeted LDCs, one of the highest LDC shares among the developed countries. However, as outlined above, specific recipients and projects to be funded in future support have not been provided in the submission. On gender-responsiveness, the biennial communication states: “Gender Equality is a key policy priority (alongside climate), recognising that women are disproportionately affected by climate change, our climate finance is channelled into sectors and interventions which are of greatest relevance to women.” And that: “As a priority, gender is mainstreamed across all of our Development efforts. Ireland also funds the Gender Action Plan through the UNFCCC secretariat.”

Information provided in the submission states: “With the exception of a few heavily-caveated multiannual funding arrangements, all public climate finance provided by Ireland annually is considered new and additional.” This definition does not protect against increases in Irish climate finance displacing ODA and does not ensure additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Concerning the mainstreaming of climate support in development, the biennial communication evidences that climate is integrated throughout decision making: “All Irish bilateral missions operate under a country strategy framework. These strategies are developed in consultation with stakeholders in partner countries,” and that “Ireland’s own national climate action plan commits us to include climate as a key theme in all new country strategies.”

The information submitted acknowledges that Ireland’s experience with blended finance is nascent, as Ireland’s “preference for grant resources, as well as the fact that we do not have a domestic development bank, makes blended finance a challenge.” Detail is lacking concerning support being in line with low-emissions development: “Support for strengthening the capacity of LDCs in climate planning and budgeting is an effort to assist LDCs meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.”
The United Kingdom

The UK biennial communication submission includes indicative information outlining scaled-up provisions of climate finance up to 2025, but it lacks significant detail, preventing predictability and clarity for developing country Parties. For example, qualitative and quantitative information regarding the projects, programmes, and recipient countries to be funded is largely lacking. The submission includes an aim to continue to support balanced mitigation and adaptation objectives. No information has been provided to ensure that adaptation will continue to be provided through grants in future support. On vulnerability, the UK’s biennial communication provides limited qualitative information, though case studies highlight initiatives focused on LDCs and SIDS. The submission effectively indicates that all public climate finance is considered as new and additional, as it has not been reported in previous years. From a recipient country perspective, such a definition of additionality does not protect against increases in UK climate finance displacing ODA.
The UK’s biennial communication provides some indicative qualitative and quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate action: “The UK would double its International Climate Finance (ICF) contribution from £5.8bn in 2016/17-2020/21 to £11.6bn in 2021/22-2025/26.” This commitment represents a substantial increase in climate finance provisions, and the submission outlines four key programme themes to be undertaken through this support. However, aside from the multiyear commitment, detailed information is lacking with regard to specific recipient countries, projects, and how the pledged finance will be extended.

On providing balance between adaptation and mitigation support, the submission states: “The UK recognises that adaptation funding is a priority for many developing countries and that it is currently underfunded. Over the ICF period 2016-2020, the UK has sought a balance between our adaptation and mitigation funding, and we estimate that 47% of our ICF during this period supported adaptation action.” The submission then states that it will be the continued aim of the UK to provide balance between adaptation and mitigation finance in the future. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding recipients and the projects to be funded. From figures presented in the UK’s Fourth Biennial Report, its adaptation share in 2018 was 49%. All of the UK’s adaptation finance in 2018 was provided as grants, but there are no commitments regarding the level of grant-based support to be provided in the future.

On vulnerability, the UK’s biennial communication states: “Our ICF will focus on action to mitigate the future risks and current challenges of climate change and environmental degradation to the poorest and most vulnerable.” The submission then provides information on two programmes targeting vulnerability: the Least Developed Countries Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience, and the SIDS Hub. However, no quantitative information is provided regarding the amounts of finance to be extended to LDCs and SIDS, or the programmes and projects to be utilised. The LDC share of the UK’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD from 2017-2018 was around 41%. On gender-responsiveness, the information provided states a commitment to meet women’s and girls’ needs and priorities, and to advance gender equality, through climate finance “in line with the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25.”

Concerning additionality, the biennial communication states: “Our funding will be new and in addition to our previous £5.8bn ICF commitment.” This definition of new and additional finance does not include safeguards which state how provisions of climate finance will not displace ODA. However, clear information is provided in the submission on mainstreaming: “In 2019, the UK committed to ensuring all aid will be spent in a way that supports the Paris Agreement goals.”

Detailed information regarding plans to mobilise private finances and indicative quantitative figures are lacking in the UK’s biennial communication. The information provided amounts to a commitment to mobilise finance, and a recognition of private resources as important. Reference is made to the UK’s development finance institution, the CDC, and its existing strategy document, which indicates that the CDC will: “Increase climate finance to 30% of its new commitments in 2021. It will also adopt a more strategic approach to deploying climate finance, centred on three goals: achieving net zero portfolio emissions by 2050, supporting a just transition to low carbon economies, and investing in climate adaptation and resilience.” To achieve this, CDC will align its entire portfolio with low-emissions pathways and expand its climate finance deployment to sectors that are critical for climate mitigation and adaptation. Concerning adherence to Article 21.c of the Paris Agreement, the submission states: “Without the fundamental shift in the financial system as a whole, the climate goals of the Paris Agreement cannot be met. As set out in our 2019 Green Finance Strategy, we will champion both the systemic greening of the financial system and mobilising finance towards green and resilient sectors globally.”
Australia

While indicative quantitative information has been provided in Australia’s submission to outline provisions of climate finance up to 2025, there is a lack of clarity on the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded. This limits the predictability of the support. In addition, the A$1.5 billion commitment from 2020-2025 does not represent a significant progression beyond previous efforts, and effectively maintains the levels of the past five years. While the submission does commit to continued balance between mitigation and adaptation support, it provides no quantitative or qualitative information to show where and how it will be delivered. In addition, Australia’s past climate finances have been reported as cross-cutting in nature, meaning enhanced clarity is needed to accurately determine the split of any future provisions. The predictability of future Australian support is further limited by the information provided on additionality: Australia considers its annual climate finance to be new and additional because it has not been reported in previous years. For transparency in meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement, and for recipient countries, such a definition provides no clarity to ensure that increases in climate finance will not displace received ODA.
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| **Future level of support:** Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries? | Australia has provided some quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate support in developing countries: “Australia would extend its commitment to build climate change resilience, mitigation and adaptation with a $1.5 billion commitment over 2020-2025.” However, no indicative information has been provided in the submission (or in the referenced 2019 climate change strategy document) to clearly outline in detail the projects and recipient countries covered by the financial pledge. As a result, the completeness of the information provided on projected climate finances is lacking. Furthermore, seeing as Australia provided approximately A$1.4 billion of climate finance from 2015-2020, the extent to which this new commitment scales-up climate finances beyond past efforts is minimal. 

A. 0  B. 1 |
| **Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:** Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation? | The biennial communication states: “Australia recognises developing countries’ calls for a stronger focus on financing for adaptation and resilience,” and notes that: “Australia has performed strongly on both these measures in recent years with seventy per cent of our bilateral, regional and global climate financing going towards adaptation efforts and two thirds of our bilateral, regional and global climate finance benefiting SIDS and LDCs.” The submission states a continued desire to aim to provide balanced support: “Australia will continue to aim for a balance between mitigation and adaptation.” However, Australia’s ex-post climate finance reporting overwhelmingly reports finance as cross-cutting, without further breakdown between mitigation and adaptation objectives. This makes it difficult to determine accurate adaptation shares in Australian support, and reduces the clarity of statements concerning the continuation of past trends in future support for adaptation. 

A. 0  B. 1 |
| **The most vulnerable:** Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness? | Australia’s biennial communication includes information on developing country-led strategies: “Climate change is a key part of Australia’s annual discussions with Pacific island partner governments, to agree on how our support can help them to achieve their own climate and disaster resilience goals, targets and ambitions.” It also recognises the unique needs of the most vulnerable: “While all countries will feel the effects of climate change, developing countries, particularly SIDS and LDCs, are both more exposed and more vulnerable.” The LDC and SIDS shares of Australia’s 2017-2018 climate-related development finance were 24.7% and 55.1% respectively, both above developing country averages. However, the information provided focuses primarily on existing multiyear commitments, and there is limited enhanced information concerning future support for the most vulnerable in the submission. On gender-responsiveness: “Gender-responsive investments seek to integrate women’s and girls’ knowledge, experience and concerns and priorities into all stages of design and delivery.” 

A. 0  B. 1 |
| **Additionality:** Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance? | The information provided by Australia concerning new and additional climate finance indicates that all finance is considered as such, as long as it has not been included in prior reporting: “Given Australia’s annual budget allocation process, Australia considers all contributed finance in a particular financial year to be ‘new and additional’ to finance provided in previous financial years.” This definition does not prevent climate finance displacing ODA, and does not adhere to the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. 

A. 0  B. 0 |
| **Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience? | Concerning planning for future private-finance mobilisations, the Australian submission notes that encouraging private-sector investment is the third objective of Australia’s Climate Change Strategy. In addition, multiple initiatives are outlined within the submission to highlight how public finance will be used to mobilise private resources, alongside a general strategy for the engagements. However, less information is included to provide indicative, quantitative estimates regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Australia. The submission notes: “Australia has not reported on private finance mobilised in the past, but is developing systems and internal processes to enable this reporting in the future.” 

A. 1  B. 1 |
The biennial communication from the European Commission provides some quantitative and qualitative information outlining scaled-up future climate finance provisions from 2021-2027. In addition, the submission does broadly outline how the finances will be apportioned at the programme level, but it provides less clarity on recipient countries or specific projects to be funded. In general, the submission provides more clarity regarding the future of the EU institutions’ climate finance (channelled through the European Commission and European Development Fund) as compared to the European Investment Bank’s (EIB). Information regarding the EIB does not ensure clarity or predictability as to future amounts, issues of balance, the targeting of vulnerability or on grant-based, concessional finance. Despite this, information provided concerning the Commission’s finances states that balanced support will be provided to both adaptation and mitigation objectives, primarily through grant-based support, and with a focus on the most vulnerable. Both the European Commission’s biennial communication submission and the shared chapter presenting common information for all Member States and the EU institutions provide extremely limited information regarding the gender-responsiveness of their support. The European Commission considers all of its finance as new and additional, without any safeguards indicating how increases in climate finance do not displace ODA provisions.
### Criteria

**Future level of support:** Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

| A. 1 | B. 1 |

**Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:** Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**The most vulnerable:** Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**Additionality:** Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

| A. 0 | B. 0 |

**Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

| A. 1 | B. 1 |

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### Information provided

The submission provided by the European Commission provides some qualitative and quantitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate action in developing countries: “Total EU external action and assistance can reach EUR 98 419 million (budget heading ‘Neighbourhood and the world’), 30% of which or approximately EUR 29 526 million will be dedicated to climate-specific activities,” and that “In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has committed to gradually increase the share of its global financing dedicated to climate action and environmental sustainability to reach 50% of its operations in 2025 and beyond.” However, information regarding specific recipients and projects to be funded by the EC’s finance is lacking, with only regionality and broader programming details provided. The information on the EIB’s future provisions is far less detailed and lacks clarity.

Concerning balance, information in the biennial communication states: “The latest available figures for the period 2014-19 indicate a balance between the amounts allocated to mitigation and adaptation actions,” and that “The EU aims to maintain such an approach during the next programming period 2021-27.” However, there is no recognition of the severe imbalance in the EIB’s climate finances, with around only 8% targeting adaptation in 2018 (ACT Alliance EU, 2020) and no information highlighting how this will be addressed either through the EC’s activities or the EIB’s. It should be noted that while all of the EC’s adaptation support is grant-based, the vast majority of the EIB’s adaptation finance is provided as loans.

Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: “Specific interventions on adaptation and mitigation are designed in line with partner countries’ needs and priorities.” There is, however, a lack of detail concerning developing country ownership and the specific vulnerable countries to receive support, particularly with regard to the EIB’s climate support. With regard to prioritising the most vulnerable, the submission states: “The countries most in need, particularly least developed countries, low-income countries, fragile or crisis-struck countries will be given particular priority. Geographic programming will provide a specific, tailor-made framework for cooperation and be built on a national or regional development strategies.” The LDC and SIDS shares of the EC’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD (excluding EIB finance) in 2017-2018 were approximately 26% and 6% respectively, both above developed country averages. However, there is no detailed reference to the EC’s position or actions with regard to gender responsiveness, and only one case study regarding the EIB.

The European Commission’s submission states: “‘New and additional resources’ are considered to be resources committed after and not included in the previous National Communications or Biennial Reports.” As a result, the European Commission considers all of its finance as new and additional, without any safeguards indicating how increases in climate finance do not displace ODA provisions.

Information provided in the biennial communication states: “The EU external funding instrument will contain an investment framework for external action to raise additional financial resources for sustainable development from the private sector. Together with the private sector, this may mobilise more than half a trillion euros in investments for the period 2021-2027.” Detail is then provided regarding mobilisation of the private sector using the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) and the International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) and, to a lesser extent, the EIB. The submission therefore includes some broad details concerning plans to mobilise private-sector finances. Regarding the provision of finances in the context of Article 21.c of the Paris Agreement, the submission states: “The International Platform aims to [1] exchange and disseminate information to promote best practices in environmentally sustainable finance, [2] compare the different initiatives and identify barriers and opportunities to help scale up environmentally sustainable finance internationally, and [3] while respecting national and regional contexts, enhance international coordination where appropriate on environmentally sustainable finance issues.”
While Switzerland’s submission outlines an indicative quantitative target to provide 400 million CHF in climate finance by 2024, there is a lack of clarity on when this finance will be extended, and on the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded. The information within the submission regarding recipient countries refers primarily to broader development cooperation, rather than climate-specific activities. As a result, the submission falls far from providing predictability for developing country Parties. On balance, Switzerland commits to providing balanced grant-equivalent finance for adaptation and mitigation. As adaptation finance is more commonly provided as grants, this does mean that Swiss climate finance could still tend towards mitigation at face value. The predictability of future Swiss support is further limited by the lack of information provided on additionality. Switzerland considers its annual climate finance to be new and additional, as an enhanced focus on climate change can be observed in comparison with previous years. For recipient countries, such a definition provides no clarity to ensure that increases in climate finance will not displace ODA.
### Criteria

**Future level of support:** Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:** Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

| A. 1 | B. 1 |

**The most vulnerable:** Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

**Additionality:** Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

| A. 0 | B. 0 |

**Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

| A. 0 | B. 1 |

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### Information provided

Switzerland’s biennial communication does not provide enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance should be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes. It provides a projected total climate finance target of 400 million CHF by 2024, up from 340 million USD (333 million CHF) in 2018. Without detailed annual figures for 2020 and 2021, the biennial communication only adds detail regarding a number of multilateral organisations which it will fund: “Switzerland will continue to provide its fair share to the Global Environment Facility, the LDCF, the SCCF and the Montreal Fund and has committed in total 145.03 [million] CHF for the four-year period 2019-2022.” The information within the submission regarding recipient countries refers primarily to broader development cooperation, rather than climate-specific activities, and information on the projects to be funded is lacking.

Concerning balance, the Swiss submission states: “In 2017 and in 2018 Switzerland has provided slightly more public climate finance on a grant equivalent basis for adaptation activities in developing countries than for mitigation activities. Switzerland will continue to aim for a balance between its support to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation activities on a grant equivalent basis for 2021 and 2022.” Grant-equivalent figures help to better estimate the value of non-grant finance once the conditions of the finance are accounted for, such as that provided through loans which must be repaid, often with interest. It is important to note that grant-equivalent figures tend to increase adaptation shares, as adaptation finance is more commonly provided in the form of grants. At face value, the Swiss adaptation shares reported in its Fourth Biennial Report in 2018 were 46%. In addition, the majority of Swiss adaptation support is provided through grants, but not all is.

Concerning vulnerability, the submission states: “The Swiss support to developing countries for climate action is deployed in a demand driven manner, where the majority of partner countries prioritise adaptation over mitigation.” It continues: “Swiss delegates will continue to advocate for country ownership.” Detail and clarity concerning how finance is to be developing country-led is entirely lacking. No information is provided to specifically address how, and to what degree, finance will be extended to LDCs and SIDS. The LDC and SIDS shares of Swiss climate-related development finance reported to the OECD from 2017-2018 were 20% and 3.7% respectively.

Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states: “The promotion of gender equality is also part of one of the four strategic overarching objectives of the Swiss international cooperation strategy 2021-2024 and therefore gender responsiveness will be mainstreamed into the Swiss climate action support, where feasible.”

On additionality, the biennial communication states: “Switzerland notes that the Paris Agreement does explicitly not call for new and additional resources,” and that the Party will “continue to consider and determine its provided climate finance as new and additional.” No information is provided to explain how additionality is ensured, or what safeguards are in place to ensure that increases in climate finance do not displace provisions of broader development finance.

Switzerland’s submission states that: “Switzerland remains committed to increasing its share of mobilised private finance as part of its climate finance spending,” and that it “aims to continue to increase its share of mobilised private climate finance in 2021 and 2022.” In addition, the biennial communication states: “In order to boost the mobilisation of the private sector for climate-friendly investments in developing countries, SECO [State Secretariat for Economic Affairs] is willing to promote partnerships, including multilateral partnerships, aimed at mobilising private resources.” However, the information provided does not lay out a substantive plan on how further mobilisations will be achieved, nor point towards one published elsewhere. Concerning finances compatible with Article 2.1.c. of the Paris Agreement, the submission states: “Through various initiatives, SDC [Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation] is supporting countries in elaborating and strengthening their NDCs to ensure long-term alignment to the Paris Agreement. Moreover, partner countries have to demonstrate their commitment to ambitious climate action – this is a prerequisite for any bilateral engagement.”
Belgium

Belgium’s biennial communication provides very little enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate finance. The submission provides information outlining the characteristics of climate finances already provided to developing country Parties, and information regarding multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. As a result, Belgium has not meaningfully increased the clarity and predictability surrounding its future provisions for developing country Parties, nor evidenced that scaled-up finances will be extended. No detail has been provided to highlight the projects, programmes and recipient countries which will be financed. The biennial communication does state support for a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance, and for focused support for the most vulnerable, further highlighting Belgium’s history of doing so primarily through grants. Belgium provides no information to outline how its climate finance, past or present, is gender-responsive.
### Criteria Information provided

<table>
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<th>Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Future level of support:</strong> Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?</td>
<td>All figures provided in Belgium's biennial communication refer to data and shares already committed or disbursed, such as multyear commitments to multilateral funds, and data describing trends from previous years (2013-2019). Enhanced information outlining detailed future climate finance projections has not been provided. The submission includes only broad qualitative statements on Belgian climate finance provisions in the future, such as “increase adaptation actions” and the “scaling-up of budget lines.” Concerning geographical targets, the submission states that previous trends are the foundation of future provisions, with past targets focused on Africa, LDCs, adaptation (and cross-cutting activities) and grant-based support. Detail is therefore lacking concerning individual recipient countries and explicit assurances of continued support.</td>
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<td><strong>Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:</strong> Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?</td>
<td>The Belgian biennial communication provides no indicative quantitative information concerning the balance of climate objectives in future provisions. The submission evidences past commitments to grant-based support (96% of finance from 2013-2019) and refers to evidence of a large adaptation focus in prior reporting (over 50% of total finance across 2013-2019). These trends are noted as “foundational” to future support.</td>
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<td><strong>The most vulnerable:</strong> Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?</td>
<td>As referred to above, there is a lack of detail and clarity on the recipients, projects, and programming which will be used to extend the majority of future Belgian support. The degree to which vulnerability will be targeted in future provisions is therefore difficult to determine. Information provided highlights that over 50% of past Belgian finance can be seen to be channelled bilaterally. Of this bilateral finance, the majority is provided to LDCs in Africa, with only a relatively small share going to upper middle-income countries (UMICs). The submission also contains specific reference to harmonising climate projects with the national policy within the recipient country. LDC and SIDS shares of Belgian climate-related development finance reported to the OECD from 2017-2018 were approximately 35% and 2% respectively, both above developed country averages. There is little evidence to indicate the gender-responsiveness of any future support.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Additionality:</strong> Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?</td>
<td>Belgium describes all of its financial support as new and additional, as it comprises: “Provisions in line with Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention; Contributions which would not have existed without the financial commitments, stemming from the Copenhagen Accord; Budget lines on top of the annual budget for bilateral development cooperation; Only the climate-specific or climate-relevant part of projects and programmes; Only climate-related projects in developing countries additional to the previous reporting period; Contributions from the revenues obtained from auctioning greenhouse gas emission allowances.” Therefore, the submission conceptualises additionality in various ways when describing various portions of Belgium’s climate finance. Yet how much climate finance is truly additional to its broader provision of ODA is unclear.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation of further resources:</strong> Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?</td>
<td>Belgium’s submission acknowledges the importance of public, grant-based support, and it states a two-fold approach for future plans to mobilise additional finance from a wide variety of sources: “Private climate finance will be further mobilised by using a two-fold approach: Providing support that directly mobilises private climate finance for mitigation and adaptation measures; Supporting partner countries in designing, implementing and financing enabling environments for private investment in mitigation and adaptation measures, creating capacities that will enable institutions to develop financial products and build a portfolio over the long term. This will result in indirectly mobilising additional private investments in developing countries.” However, indicative quantitative information regarding the amounts of private-sector finance which will be mobilised by Belgium (or information regarding the public-sector finance which will be used to mobilise it) is lacking. There is therefore limited information concerning the countries in which the activities will take place, or the programmes and projects which will be funded.</td>
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Germany

Germany’s biennial communication makes little effort to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate relevant finance, referring only to existing multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. Germany has therefore not provided any information to indicate that its future provisions of climate finance will represent a progression beyond previous efforts. The communication provides no clarity explaining what is considered to be a balanced allocation of resources for adaptation and mitigation objectives. Concerning the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be financed, sufficient detail to enhance predictability is lacking. The submission states that engagements with LDCs and SIDS will continue to be a high priority to the German government, but without offering any enhanced information regarding their support to such recipients in the future. Finally, the submission does not further define additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. As Germany is one of the largest global providers of both ODA and climate finance, a lack of clarity regarding additionality could severely reduce the predictability of climate support in developing countries.
### Criteria Information provided

**Future level of support:** Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 0**

**Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:** Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

- **A. 0**
- **B. 0**

**The most vulnerable:** Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 0**

**Additionality:** Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

- **A. 0**
- **B. 0**

**Mobilisation of further resources:** Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

- **A. 1**
- **B. 1**

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Germany’s biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance, but only a weak, broader reference to constancy: “Climate financing will probably remain at least at a constant level for the next 2 years.” Additional information cites multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF and the GEF as indicative of future German support. Information on projected climate finance does not provide a holistic picture of future levels of support, and does not include information outlining the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be funded. The submission states: “To ensure transparency towards recipient countries, Germany publishes its lists of partner countries on a regular basis,” and that Germany “will continue to provide targeted support to the most vulnerable countries in the group of least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).”

Regarding balanced provisions of climate finance, the submission states: “Germany strives for a balanced allocation of resources for climate finance to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. The German government has kept its climate finance from budgetary sources close to parity throughout the past years and will continue to do its best in order to maintain this balance.” Parity is referred to explicitly only with regard to climate finance from budgetary sources, while the balanced allocation of resources to be extended elsewhere is not clearly defined. Beyond the support provided through budgetary sources, German climate finance has tended to favour mitigation objectives in the past. In 2018, the adaptation share of German climate finance included in the Fourth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC was less than 30%, indicating a significant lack of balance. Furthermore, a significant portion of Germany’s adaptation finance is not grant-based.

Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission states: “The German government follows a partner country demand-driven approach in the allocation of bilateral climate finance. In each partner country, cooperation areas are defined in a dialogue on equal terms,” and: “Germany is also a founding member and major donor of the NDC [Nationally Determined Contributions] Partnership... A country-driven approach is at the core of the NDC Partnership’s work.” Concerning vulnerability, the biennial communication adds: “Germany provides targeted support to the most vulnerable countries in the group of LDCs and SIDS.” The submission further cites finances channelled through the LDCF as in support of the most vulnerable. However, the LDC share of German climate-related development finance reported to the OECD from 2017-2018 was approximately 12%, a figure below developed country averages. Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states: “Gender-responsive design of climate policy and the implementation of gender responsive adaptation and mitigation strategies is a priority, also reflected in the Development Policy Action Plan on Gender Equality 2016-2020.”

Concerning additionality, the communication states: “New and additional climate finance means that all funds are newly pledged or disbursed in the reporting year and have not been reported in previous years as climate finance.” This definition does not ensure the additionality of climate finance, in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, and does not outline safeguards to prevent increases in climate finance displacing provisions of ODA.

Concerning plans to mobilise private-sector finances for climate action, the submission states: “Climate finance will continue to be mobilised using a twofold approach: firstly, by directly mobilising private climate finance for mitigation and adaptation measures, for example through public co-financing or guarantees (in accordance with established budgetary procedures and national regulations). Secondly, by supporting partner countries in designing, implementing and financing enabling environments for private investment in mitigation and adaptation measures.” However, the information provided does not include indicative quantitative information regarding mobilised private finances. On the provision of finances consistent with low-emissions development, the biennial communication adds: “Germany has been a strong advocate of aligning public finance institutions with the goals of the Paris Agreement.”
The Netherlands

The Netherlands’ biennial communication provides little enhanced quantitative information to outline its future provisions of climate finance. The submission provides information outlining the finances to be provided in 2021, with information regarding multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions the only detail extending beyond that year. As a result, the Netherlands has not significantly increased the clarity and predictability surrounding its future provisions for developing country Parties. Furthermore, the projected public climate finance total for 2021 exceeds the amount provided by the Netherlands in 2018 by just 4 million EUR. There is a lack of detail regarding the projects and recipient countries to be financed, with references only included to wider geographic regions. The biennial communication contains no information on the adaptation and mitigation shares of its indicative 2021 total, and no firm commitment towards balance in the future. The submission does acknowledge the tendency of mobilised private climate finance towards mitigation activities, leading to a commitment to prioritise engagements with the private sector to promote adaptation activities. The Netherlands does not provide a clear and meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
### Criteria

#### Information provided

Information in the Netherlands’ biennial communication includes projected levels of public financial resources for climate action in developing countries in 2021: “In 2021, the Netherlands expects to provide 580 million Euro public climate finance and mobilise 600 million Euro in private climate finance.” No information is provided for additional years, aside from a selection of multyear commitments to some multilateral institutions. Importantly, the Netherlands provided 576 million EUR in 2018, and therefore the committed amount for 2021 does not represent significantly scaled-up climate finance provisions. Regarding recipient countries, the submission refers only to regions: “The Netherlands is shifting its bilateral aid relationships from the former 15 partner countries to countries in West-Africa/Sahel, Northern-Africa, Middle East and the Horn of Africa.” Enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes, has not been provided.

#### Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

- **A. 0**  
- **B. 1**

#### Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

- **A. 0**  
- **B. 1**

#### The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

- **A. 0**  
- **B. 1**

#### Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

- **A. 0**  
- **B. 0**

#### Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

- **A. 1**  
- **B. 0**

Concerning the balanced support stipulated in the Paris Agreement, the Netherlands’ submission states: “The Netherlands aims to provide balanced support to mitigation and adaptation.” It goes on to acknowledge the imbalance in global flows of mobilised private finance: “The Netherlands has decided to focus explicitly on mobilising the private sector for adaptation.” Yet there is no firm commitment to parity, and no indicative quantitative information on the balance between climate objectives in 2021 provisions. Furthermore, while the Netherlands has consistently provided more adaptation finance than mitigation finance, the majority of Dutch climate support in previous years has been extended as cross-cutting finance. The actual objective breakdown of such finance remains unknown.

Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the submission indicates that: “For the countries and regions on which the Netherlands focuses its development cooperation, climate change profiles have been drafted and regularly updated”. There is no information provided showing how these profiles are led by developing countries. A degree of the information provided focuses on poverty reduction, and states: “Dutch support for climate action is part of development cooperation, we have a strong focus on poverty. Poorer people and communities are typically affected the most by climate change.” There is no explicit reference to vulnerability in the Netherlands’ biennial communication, and it does not show how, or to what degree, finance will be extended towards specific countries. The LDC share of Dutch climate-related development finance reported to the OECD as provided in 2017-2018 was approximately 31%, a figure above developed country average. On gender-responsiveness, the biennial communication states only: “Gender is an important cross-cutting issue, as climate action is most effective when it builds on the capacities and addresses the needs as well as the vulnerabilities of both genders.”

The Dutch submission considers all climate finance to be new and additional as it has not been reported in previous years: “Disbursements for climate action in developing countries is/are financed from the budget for foreign trade and development cooperation. This budget is approved by Parliament annually, providing new and additional resources to the budgets approved in previous years.” This definition does not ensure additionality, nor indicate that climate finance and ODA are considered as mutually exclusive flows.

Despite strong evidence of comprehensive engagement with the private sector through the multilateral development banks (MDBs), the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, etc, the information provided in the submission fails to outline a detailed plan to enable future mobilisations of private climate finance. Concerning finance aligned with low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: “The Netherlands’ ambition is to ‘green’ the instruments for foreign trade and development cooperation,” and that the budget of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation will be “phasing-out public-funded grants for coal projects and for exploration and development of new oil and gas reserves.”
Norway

Norway’s biennial communication provides little indicative information regarding the Party’s future provisions of climate finance, and it does not provide indicative annual totals within the submission. Instead, the communication presents a selection of multiannual commitments and programmes as examples of future support, and remains far from evidencing a holistic picture of the support that it intends to provide in the coming years. As a result, Norway has not indicated how it will provide scaled-up provisions of finance beyond previous efforts. Little detailed information is presented detailing the projects and recipient countries to be funded, preventing the predictability and clarity of future support. Despite the overwhelming majority of Norway’s past climate finance being reported as having mitigation objectives, the submission does not include any commitment towards balance in the future, instead stating that prior support for adaptation has been underestimated. In addition, the biennial communication does not provide clarity or detail concerning support for the most vulnerable, including women and girls. Information has been provided to indicate that the Party’s provisions of climate finance will be in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA, and therefore can be considered as new and additional.
Norway provides some qualitative and quantitative information on the projected levels of public financial resources that it expects to provide for climate action in developing countries. However, the information falls short of providing indicative totals of climate finances to be extended in specific years, or to which recipient countries. It instead mainly focuses on the finance to be extended through a selection of programmes and organisations, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and The Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). Many of the financial pledges and disbursements occurred over the last decade, and such information can therefore not be considered as enhanced. As acknowledged in the submission itself, much of the finance indicated as in support of target areas will not qualify as climate finance and only as development finance more broadly. Regarding recipient countries, the submission states that Norwegian ODA is extended to 16 partner countries, yet the climate finance extended to each varies significantly. Colombia, Ethiopia and Indonesia are said to receive comparatively large volumes of climate-related ODA due to their relevance for NICFI, yet further detail is lacking. The information provided in Norway’s submission is therefore incomplete and does not evidence finance compliant with Article 9.4 of the Paris Agreement with regard to scaled-up resources.

In Norway’s climate finance reporting to the UN in biennial reports, the vast majority of climate finance is reported as mitigation finance. Norway’s Fourth Biennial Report in 2018 shows 9% of Norway’s climate finance targeted adaptation. Norway’s submission states that financial contributions made through NICFI underestimate the adaptation share of their budget and that: “Norway plans to increase ODA for climate adaptation and resilience through both bilateral and multilateral channels. Details will be outlined in a strategy to be finalized in 2021”. Although there is a plan to increase ODA for adaptation, there is no reference to balance or parity between it and mitigation objectives. Little detail is provided on the actual adaptation and mitigation finance components of the specific financial commitments included in the submission, though it is noted that GCF outflows must represent balanced provisions.

Concerning the mobilisation of private finance, Norway highlights a selection of its activities which interact with the private sphere, with some indication of how further resources will be mobilised in the future. The biennial communication outlines that Norfund remains “the key commercial investment instrument of Norway’s development policy.” The submission further notes that Norfund reached a portfolio goal to extend 50% of its investments towards renewable energy, that renewable energy investments will be a “key element” of Norfund’s strategy from 2019-2022, and that the proposed 2021 recapitalisation of Norfund (for all activities) is 1.7 billion NOK. The submission further outlines how Norwegian support promotes low-emissions development abroad. Information is provided indicating that Norway supports market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement, such as the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility, and that: “Norway supports carbon pricing whereby the polluters pay and investments in low-emission technologies are incentivized.”
Denmark

Denmark’s biennial communication demonstrates little effort to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate relevant finance, referring only to existing multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. In addition, Denmark provides no clear commitment indicating that balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance will be extended in the future. Concerning the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be financed, sufficient detail to enhance predictability is lacking. However, Denmark does have a record of providing grant-based support with a significant focus on vulnerable countries and regions such as the LDCs. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
Denmark's biennial communication provides indicative quantitative information neither on projected levels of public financial resources, nor on the projects and recipient countries to be funded. Its reporting of commitments, alongside disbursements to the EU and UNFCCC, does provide some indicative information to recipients concerning multiyear commitments and country programmes. However, as this information is included in reporting elsewhere, the information cannot be considered enhanced. The biennial communication indicates that the 2020 Finance Act “signalled a strong intention to significantly increase the level of climate relevant development assistance.” Current levels of mobilised private finance (through the MDBs and the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU)) are estimated and included, alongside a statement that Denmark will aim to maintain these levels over the coming years. Concerning specific recipients, statements in the submission recognise vulnerability and yet refer only to regions: “A climate focused development policy focuses on support to adaptation and resilience building in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, in particular in Africa.”

Information in the submission presents a statement concerning balance: “Denmark aims to ensure that public finance for adaptation and mitigation is provided in a balanced manner,” but without further detail to outline what such a manner would practically mean. The submission further states that the principles of the Danish Climate Envelope help to ensure balance between adaptation and mitigation: “[The Climate Envelope] aims at ensuring that approximately half of the envelope’s funds are directed to adaptation and resilience building in the poorest and most vulnerable countries.” However, the Climate Envelope does not make up all Danish climate finance commitments and disbursements, and there is no explicit statement indicating that balanced support will be provided in the future. 44% of the climate finance reported in Denmark's Fourth Biennial Report in 2018 was provided for adaptation activities, all of which was grant-based.

Denmark's biennial communication states: “The Danish policies and priorities appreciate the diversity of the support needs of different groups of developing countries. Public grant based financing in particular targets the poorest and most fragile countries and regions with a particular focus on Africa.” Furthermore, the submission adds: “Climate support is mainly targeting a range of priority countries in Africa. Most of these countries are Least Developed Countries (LDCs).” Denmark’s share of LDC finance reported to the OECD has historically been above developed country averages, standing at 41% from 2017-2018. The Danish submission also acknowledges the specific needs of LDCs and SIDS, and of country-driven strategies. However, as little information has been provided on projected future finance, particularly regarding the programmes and projects to be funded, the predictability of support for the most vulnerable is not significantly enhanced. Gender equality is referred to as a cross-cutting priority in climate-related development, and is clearly outlined in broader development policy, but the submission lacks explicit details concerning this.

Concerning new and additional finances, the information considers “finance for climate change adaptation or mitigation activities within the reporting period and finance that was not previously reported to UNFCCC as new and additional finance.” Such a definition does not ensure the additionality of climate finance in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. In addition, no information is included to evidence that provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.

The information provided in the submission states that the efforts of Denmark's International Fund for Developing Countries to mobilise private-sector finance will be continued and supplemented. “Through innovative funds, such as the Danish Climate Investment Fund and the SDG [Sustainable Development Goals] Fund, IFU has mobilised billions of USD from private investors, including pension funds, for climate relevant investments in developing countries.” Concerning finance consistent with low-emissions development, the information provided states: “Aligning all investments – public, private and [International Finance Institutions] and MDBs– with the Paris Agreement and the SDGs is imperative to strengthen sustainable carbon neutral development and climate resilience.”
France

France’s biennial communication, and subsequent pledges thereafter, demonstrate some effort to increase the predictability of future climate finance for developing countries but has failed to commit to scale-up its support. Announced at the Climate Ambition Summit 2020, France’s annual pledge to commit 6 billion EUR of climate finance annually post-2020 effectively maintains the level of climate finance provided by the Party in 2019. Aside from the enhanced quantitative information outlining future aggregate figures, other references within the biennial communication are only made to past multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. Concerning the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be financed, detail is also lacking, which hinders predictability. In addition, while France commits to support a gender equality and rights-based approach in its support for climate action, it fails to provide details on how it plans to deliver on that. Despite committing to provide a third of its climate finance towards adaptation, France provides no explicit commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance, and has not provided balanced, predominantly grant-based support for adaptation in the past. As a result, the extent to which the most vulnerable will be targeted in future support is also unclear. On additionality, the submission provides neither clarity nor a meaningful definition in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. As France is one of the largest global providers of both ODA and climate finance, this lack of clarity regarding additionality could severely reduce the predictability of climate support in developing countries.
Information provided in France's biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance in the future, referring primarily to finances provided in 2019 and 2020. The submission states that France provided 5.96 billion EUR of climate finance in 2019, meeting its 2015 target to provide 5 billion EUR annually. At the Climate Action Summit 2020, France pledged to provide 6 billion EUR of climate finance annually, thereby committing to maintain the level of climate finance provided in 2019 post-2020.

The submission tends to provide information on multianual commitments to multilateral institutions such as the GCF and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and to individual channels such as the French Development Agency (AFD). Concerning the AFD, the submission states that there are: "Strong commitments in its 2017-2022 climate strategy, including ensuring that 50% of annual financing has a direct and beneficial impact on climate." Yet it remains unclear how these direct and beneficial impacts translate into predictable climate finance figures from a recipient perspective. France has provided limited enhanced, quantitative information ensuring the predictability of finance for recipient Parties. The information provided in the submission lacks detail concerning recipient countries, and focuses primarily on regionality. "In its 2017-2022 climate strategy, AFD indicated that climate commitments will have to account for at least 70% of all its commitments in Asia and Latin America areas, at least 50% of all its commitments in the Mediterranean area, and at least 30% of all its commitments in the Sub-Saharan Africa area."

Concerning developing country-driven strategies the submission states: "In each country, the AFD local office elaborates a strategy which is presented to the national partners and shared with the Ministry of Finance in the country to ensure its consistency with the needs and priorities of the country." Concerning vulnerability, detailed information on the degree to which future French provisions of climate finance will target the most vulnerable is lacking. However, the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) strategy outlines France’s priority countries for development partnerships, in particular sub-Saharan Africa. Information in the biennial communication refers to financial provisions to the GCF, LDCF, and Adaptation Fund as institutions with a strong focus on adaptation in LDCs and SIDS. LDCs and SIDS are referred to primarily in the context of the existing pledge of 1.5 billion EUR of adaptation finance, rather than in the context of future finances. The LDC share of France's climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2018 was approximately 14%, below the developed country average, while the share of finance going to SIDS was approximately 3%, above the developed country average.

The information provided in the submission concerning the gender-responsiveness of French support lacks detail, briefly stating: “In its assistance, including support for climate action, France supports a gender equality and rights-based approach.” Furthermore, the information provided in the EU's shared chapter simply notes: “Gender is an important cross-cutting issue for the EU, as climate action is most effective when it builds on capacities and addresses the needs and vulnerabilities of both genders.” Again, this lacks substantive detail.

The definition of new and additional climate finance provided in the French submission states: “France defines new and additional climate finance as newly committed or disbursed climate finance during each year.” This definition does not ensure additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the submission provides no information outlining how future provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.

Information provided in the submission focuses on the French Development Agency’s private-sector subsidiary, PROPARCO, which is explicitly focused on mobilising private-sector finance. Information provided focuses on the past record of France’s engagements with the private sector, and fails to explicitly outline a plan to mobilise further private climate finances in the future. Concerning financial flows being consistent with low-emissions development, the communication cites France’s 30 million EUR grant to the AFD 2050 Facility, which supports the design and implementation of long-term low emission and climate-resilient development strategies in around thirty developing countries.
Italy

Italy has not provided enhanced quantitative information within its biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to existing multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. In addition, the submission lacks clarity regarding the recipient countries to be financed. The biennial communication states that Italy aims to strike a “fair balance” between mitigation and adaptation activities, but without clearly defining what that means. This is problematic, particularly because the majority of Italian climate finance is reported as cross-cutting in nature, without further detail on the extent to which mitigation and adaptation are targeted. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
### Criteria

#### Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?

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Italy’s biennial communication does not provide enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes. Information in the submission refers primarily to past finances, and to multiyear commitments to institutions such as the GCF, the Adaptation Fund, and the GEF, among others. A holistic picture of projected levels of public financial resources for climate change action in developing countries has not been provided. Concerning specific recipients, priority countries are outlined only with reference to projects undertaken from 2017-2020, and there is no detail concerning how much future climate finance will be extended to individual recipient countries.

#### Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?

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Clarity in the information provided regarding adaptation and mitigation balance is lacking, and there is no explicit commitment to providing balanced support in the future: “In 2017-2018 the component of the total public climate finance addressing mitigation and adaptation was 65%, while in 2015-2016 it was 53%, without considering crosscutting activities (see UNFCCC BR3 and BR4). This increasing trend may stabilize in support provided in the current biennium and in the next future.” The majority of the climate finance reported by Italy to the UNFCCC is cross-cutting support, and lacks further detail on the actual extent to which mitigation and adaptation are targeted. The majority of cross-cutting and adaptation support is provided as grants.

#### The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?

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Regarding developing country-driven strategies, the submission states that bilateral cooperation “is based on a peer exchange with partner countries and the definition of programs, projects and activities based on the beneficiaries’ requests and priorities.” The conditions for bilateral activities and projects to be approved look to ensure that: the initiative is owned by the recipient country; there is mutual agreement with the recipient country at every stage of project’s design and approval; the activity follows the objectives contained in recipient country’s NDC. The submission also states that Italian development support adheres to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Concerning vulnerability, no detail is provided which explicitly refers to future climate finance, although it is stated that the focus of Italian bilateral support through The Ministry of Environment focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, SIDS, and LDCs. From 2017-2018, as reported to the OECD, Italy provided approximately 20% of its climate-related development finance to LDCs and 2% to SIDS, with both figures at the level of developed country averages. No information is provided on how Italian climate support ensures gender-responsiveness.

#### Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?

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Italy’s submission defines new and additional climate finance as: “Funds that are newly pledged or disbursed in the reporting year and have not been reported in previous years as climate finance.” This definition does not ensure additionality, nor adhere to the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC in safeguarding against the displacement of ODA.

#### Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?

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Concerning a plan to mobilise further climate finance resources, the information provided in the Italian biennial communication states: “The Italian development cooperation will support partnerships with private profit and non-profit entities aimed at encouraging investments with a high social and environmental impact, and programmes to promote the creation of decent work, particularly for women and young people.” However, the information provided falls short of a clear and detailed plan for future engagements with the private sector.

Concerning low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: “Italy is supporting the alignment of financial and policy support to developing countries with the objectives of the Paris Agreement in different fora, from MDBs to investment funds and the relevant OECD working groups for methodological and policy advancements.” The submission lacks detail on how Italian development cooperation actually ensures adherence to Article 21.c.
Canada

Canada’s biennial communication makes little attempt to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate relevant finance, referring only to existing multiyear commitments to multilateral institutions. The communication provides no clear commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance in the future, and does little to explain how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable. However, concerning gender-responsiveness the Canadian submission states that initiatives are strongly aligned to Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, alongside other priorities. Yet there is a need for enhanced information to add additional clarity, especially as Canada does not have a record of providing balanced finance or for grant-based instruments. The information provided also falls far short of providing a clear and meaningful definition of additionality from a recipient country perspective.
Canada’s biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance in the future. The limited information refers to past provisions, and to multiannual commitments already made to multilateral institutions, such as a C$300 million commitment to the GCF and additional commitments to the World Bank. The information can therefore not be considered as enhancing the predictability of climate finances for developing countries. Canada has not provided quantitative information offering a holistic picture of future projected climate finance provisions. As a result, clarity and detail regarding recipients of future finances, and the projects and programmes to be used to extend the support, is also lacking. At the time of writing, the Government of Canada is preparing to publish its next five-year climate finance package, after consultations with the public and civil society organisations (CSOs).

There is no reference to balance in the context of finance for adaptation and mitigation objectives in Canada’s biennial communication. In addition, ex-post reporting in Canada’s Fourth Biennial Report shows that previous provisions have been significantly imbalanced, with the adaptation and mitigation shares of climate support in 2017 and 2018 totalling 30% and 14% respectively.

Canada has failed to provide clarity and detail regarding its future provisions of climate finance, and has instead focused only on examples of future commitments. There is therefore no information provided to outline how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of the climate-related development finance reported by Canada to the OECD in 2017-2018 were around 16% and 14%, the former below developed country averages and the latter greater than them. On grant-based support, Canada’s biennial communication notes their use “where affordable market-based financing is not viable, for example, for many adaptation projects in the poorest and most vulnerable countries.” Yet of the climate finance reported in Canada’s Fourth Biennial Report, only around 43% of the disbursements were made using grants.

Concerning gender-responsiveness, the submission states: “Canada selects initiatives that strongly align with its climate program priorities as well as broader international priorities, notably Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy,” and it provides examples of commitments that consider gender as a cross-cutting issue. As of 2019, 93% of projects funded by Canada through climate finance mechanisms mainstreamed gender equality concerns, yet a much smaller proportion held gender equality as their principal objective (AidWatch Canada, 2019).

Canada’s submission includes a definition of new and additional finance, stating: “Projected levels of Canada’s public climate finance are based on multi-year commitments. These commitments are new and additional climate finance as they are above and beyond what was planned prior to the Copenhagen Accord [2009].” It is unclear whether Canada considers all finance planned after 2009 to be new and additional, or whether the finance provided in 2009 is seen as a baseline, above which finance is considered to be new and additional. In either case, the definition does not ensure additionality in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the definition does not include safeguards which show how increases in climate finance are achieved without the displacement of development finance.

Canada does not outline a detailed plan to mobilise private finance in the future, but instead provides case studies of its efforts to do so in the past, while stating its collaboration with development banks and multilateral institutions. No indicative information concerning future amounts of private finance to be mobilised is provided. However, it is important to note that the Government of Canada has mobilised significant volumes of climate finance via Export Development Canada.

Concerning aligning financial flows with low-emissions development and climate resilience, detail is lacking. The submission states: “Canada’s climate finance investments and other initiatives are supporting developing countries in their efforts to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement,” and it provides some additional examples.
Portugal

Portugal has not provided any substantive, enhanced quantitative or qualitative information within its biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to past commitments, projects and programmes. Portugal includes no formal commitment to balanced adaptation and mitigation finance in the future, but has a record of providing near parity between the two. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding gender-responsiveness, nor support to the most vulnerable, including LDCs and SIDS. Concerning additionality, Portugal states that it considers development and climate finance to be mutually exclusive flows, ensuring the latter can be considered as new and additional.
No quantitative or qualitative information on projected levels of public financial resources for climate action in developing countries have been provided. Information concerns only past provisions of Portuguese climate finance, and its recipients and programmes.

Information in the submission indicates that balanced provisions of climate finance have been sought, but that adaptation was often favoured due to Portugal’s provisions responding to developing countries’ needs. The submission contains no explicit commitment to provide balanced provisions in the future. In 2018, the adaptation share of Portuguese climate finance included in the country’s Fourth Biennial Report was more than 50%, all of which was grant-based.

Portugal has not provided information in response to all of the requests outlined in the Annex to the COP decision regarding Article 9.5. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states: “Portugal establishes Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) discussed and agreed with partner countries. It is the partner country that puts forward its own proposals for programs, projects or actions and presents it to the Portuguese Cooperation or the Environmental Fund for financing. Programs, projects or actions which are developed in close cooperation with national institutions and local communities in the recipient countries.”

Information on support to LDCs and SIDS, and on vulnerability in general, has not been provided. Nor has any information on the gender-responsiveness of provisions. The LDC and SIDS shares of Portugal’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 were approximately 65% and 57% respectively, both above developed country averages.

Information provided in the submission states: “In 2016 Portugal established the Environmental Fund (FA) with the aim to finance actions focused on environment and climate change mainly at domestic level. However, the FA has a dedicated window to support financing ODA projects. Given the non-conventional nature of this source of ODA flows, Portugal considers this financial mechanism as a new and additional source of funding.” Portugal’s definition creates a distinction between the climate finance provided through the FA and the finances provided through other channels, with only the former being considered new and additional. Due to the separation of climate finance from broader development finance, this definition of additionality does, to some extent, comply with the spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.

Portugal’s biennial communication does not include information regarding the mobilisation of further resources, or the consistency of flows with low emissions and climate resilience.
Spain

Spain has not provided substantive, enhanced quantitative information within its biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to past commitments, projects and programmes. Spain includes no formal commitment to balanced adaptation and mitigation finance within the biennial communication, yet does acknowledge prior imbalances. Beyond referring to gender as a mainstreaming priority, no information is included to indicate how gender-responsive finance will be provided in the future. In addition, little information is provided to highlight how, and to what degree, support will target the most vulnerable, including LDCs and SIDS, despite Spain evidencing a large focus on such countries in past support. Concerning additionality, Spain’s submission states that new and climate-specific activities are considered new and additional, without providing information which indicates the extent to which climate and development finances can be considered as mutually exclusive.
Information provided in Spain’s biennial communication does not include quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance. The submission only provides some indicative information concerning projected levels of finance to a selection of specific multilateral institutions provided through multiannual commitments. The submission further states that support will be continued with regard to some specific bilateral programmes, which are named alongside the beneficiary countries. However, a holistic picture of future provisions of Spanish climate finance, using quantitative annual or periodical projections, is not given.

Spain’s biennial communication acknowledges that, historically, Spanish climate finance provisions have not been balanced. “Spain’s public support directed to climate change adaptation in developing countries is still lower than the one for mitigation. However, Spain is committed to supporting adaptation needs in developing countries and is exploring several options to enhance this balance between adaptation and mitigation dedicated support, including by making new contributions to the Adaptation Fund.” The adaptation share of the climate finance included in Spain’s Fourth Biennial Report in 2018 was just 16%, and the current biennial communication contains no explicit pledge to ensure balance in the future. The vast majority of Spanish adaptation support is grant-based.

Concerning developing country-driven strategies, information in Spain’s biennial communication is lacking and refers only to the common chapter of the EU submission. On vulnerability, the submission states: “Regarding developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, the [Spanish Cooperation Master Plan] continues to focus on the geographic areas where the Spanish cooperation work clearly shows an added value, while promoting a results-oriented development cooperation.”

Information in the submission states: “Spain considers that contributions are new and additional when support is given to activities that are new and/or specific on climate change. In this context, Spain has made a big internal effort on increasing its support for new climate change activities (meaning projects, programmes, funds, etc.), through bilateral and multilateral contributions, while working at the same time on the continuation of supporting existing activities and on the mainstreaming of climate change in all international cooperation instruments.” This definition does not ensure additionality in accordance with the spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC. Nor does it provide information to state how any increases in climate finance would not displace provisions of ODA.

Spain’s biennial communication states that the mobilisation of private-sector finance is considered in both bilateral and multilateral climate finance channels. However, the submission only refers to current actions, and contains little detail concerning a clear plan to mobilise further resources in the future. However, multiple channels and institutions mobilising private climate finance have been referenced elsewhere in the biennial communication. Concerning financial provisions in line with low-emissions development and climate resilience, the submission states: “Spain plays a leading role in mobilising private climate finance and promotes actions to shifts investments, in line with Article 21.c of the Paris Agreement, both domestically and in recipient countries,” with the submission adding that: “Spain is in the process of operationalising Article 21.c and exploring the array of tools available to cost-effectively manage the transition in order to mobilise private finance.” Furthermore, the biennial communication states that the new Climate Change and Energy Transition Law will “help to attract and sustain high levels of finance for climate investments and eventually make all investments climate compatible” and that the new International Climate Finance Strategy will seek to align provisions with the Paris Agreement.
Austria

Austria has not provided enhanced quantitative information within its biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission refers only to an increasing budget line for climate action, some of which is earmarked as international climate finance, and does not include annual or aggregate figures for future climate finance provisions. The biennial communication refers primarily to existing commitments, projects and programmes. Austria do not provide a clear commitment to, or definition of, balance regarding support for mitigation and adaptation activities. In addition, the submission makes no reference to neither vulnerability nor LDCs and SIDS. Enhanced information is needed for clarity, particularly as Austria does not have a record of providing balanced finance or large volumes of grant-based support to LDCs or SIDS in comparison with other developed country Parties. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
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<tr>
<td>Future level of support: Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?</td>
<td>Austria provides limited detail regarding quantitative and qualitative information on projected levels of climate finance, stating in the submission: “From 2021 to 2023, the budget line for climate action will be increased compared to 2020; part of this increase will be dedicated to international climate finance.” No enhanced information is provided, as references are only made to the Austrian Development Policy 2019-2021, without any information on its relevance to future provisions of climate finance. Austria provides some information on multiyear commitments to selected multilateral institutions such as the GCF, and to the climate finance portfolio of the Ministry for Climate Action. Regarding recipient countries and programmes, reference is made to the Austrian Development Agency’s geographical priorities, stating: “A focus lies on Least Developed Countries, such as Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique. Further priorities are South Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region as well as fragile states.”</td>
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<td>Balance between adaptation and mitigation support: Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?</td>
<td>Information provided in the biennial communication states: “Austria strives to achieve in the longer term a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation in our bilateral cooperation, while noting that such a balance must be viewed in a comprehensive manner (both quantitatively and qualitatively, and acknowledging that projects often address both adaptation and mitigation elements).” There is no strong, explicit commitment towards balancing mitigation and adaptation finances. In 2019, according to the submission, the distribution of bilateral grants was 30% for adaptation, 43% for cross cutting projects, and 27% for mitigation. This indicates that a large volume of cross-cutting finance has been provided, without further details on its objectives. Austria’s Fourth Biennial Report in 2018 highlights that the adaptation share of total Austrian climate finance was below 25%, with a significant share of that finance not grant-based.</td>
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<td>The most vulnerable: Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?</td>
<td>The Austrian biennial communication makes little reference to vulnerability, LDCs, or SIDS. It does indicate that the Austrian Development Agency’s geographic priorities, including LDCs, are outlined in its Three-Year Programme. The LDC share of Austrian climate-related development finance reported to the OECD from 2017-2018 was approximately 11%, far below developed country donor averages. The share allocated to SIDS was 0.4% of total climate-related finance over the same period. Again, this is below developed country donor averages. The extent of information concerning gender-responsiveness within the submission is also sparse: “Gender responsiveness and the empowerment of women is an important criterion in project selection.” The Austrian Strategy for International Climate Finance notes gender equality as a cross-cutting issue. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, Austria cooperates with partner countries based on the internationally agreed principles of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.</td>
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<td>Additionality: Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?</td>
<td>Concerning additionality, the submission defines it as: “A gradual scaling up of support over time, with new programmes, projects and focus areas supplementing and/or extending existing initiatives over time, with the overall volume of support provided increasing in the longer term.” This definition does not ensure additionality in the context of the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, and it fails to include safeguards which show how increases in climate finance are achieved without the displacement of development finance.</td>
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<td>Mobilisation of further resources: Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?</td>
<td>No clear plan to mobilise further resources is included in the submission, with information referring only to past provisions of climate finance. The Austrian Green Finance Agenda is mentioned as bringing together public and private-sector representatives to discuss barriers, incentives and necessary frameworks for redirecting financial flows and mobilising private capital for climate action. Three explicit initiatives are included - the Financial Market Authority, PACTA2020, and the Green Finance Agenda - which indicate that the government aims at aligning investments by Austrian actors domestically and internationally to find a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.</td>
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Czech Republic

While indications of future development finance provisions have been included in the Czech Republic’s biennial communication, little effort has been made to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no clear commitment indicating that balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance will be extended in the future, or any references to vulnerability, LDCs and SIDS. The Czech Republic has not provided any information concerning new and additional climate finance.
Information in the Czech Republic’s biennial communication includes projected levels of development finance. However, it does not include projected levels of public financial resources for climate action: “The Czech development cooperation budget for 2021 was approved by the government on 8 June 2020 in the total amount of CZK 1.1 billion, with equal allocations envisaged for 2022 and 2023.” In addition, information has not been provided regarding provisions to multilateral partners, or regarding the specific projects and programmes to be used to extend the finance.

Recipients of Czech development cooperation are outlined in the submission: “Based on our 2018-2030 Development Cooperation Strategy, the Czech Republic focuses its bilateral development assistance on six priority countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Georgia, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Zambia.” Priority sectors and cross-cutting issues such as gender equality are also outlined, but detail is lacking.

The submission provides no definition of new and additional. There is very sparse information included on the mainstreaming of climate change into development support, with only a single case study offered. Detail is lacking on mobilisation of the private sector and low-emissions development, and no clear plan is outlined on how further finance will proceed. The submission states: “While the B2B programme mobilises private finance via simple co-financing, the Development Guarantee programme leverages the entire investment from private capital”, evidencing some interaction with the private sector using ODA.
Greece

Greece’s biennial communication shows little effort to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no enhanced quantitative information to outline future provisions of climate relevant finance. In addition, Greece provides only a weak statement regarding balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance, and has reported only cross-cutting finance in the past, thus making it difficult to assess. Concerning the projects, programmes and recipient countries to be financed, sufficient detail to enhance predictability is lacking. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
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<td><strong>Future level of support</strong></td>
<td>Greece’s biennial communication does not provide enhanced information outlining detailed future provisions of climate finance, including how much finance will be extended to specific recipient countries, projects, and programmes. The information in the submission includes a weak, qualitative statement concerning future provisions of climate finance: “As the economy recovers it is expected that Greece’s ODA and subsequently the climate finance provided to developing countries will resume a positive trajectory.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Balance between adaptation and mitigation support</strong></td>
<td>Concerning balance, the submission states: “Greece is in favour of a good balance between adaptation and mitigation finance according to developing countries’ priorities,” and yet no assurances of balance in future support is provided. All of Greece’s current support is provided as cross-cutting finance, and therefore, the precise adaptation-mitigation shares are difficult to determine.</td>
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<td><strong>The most vulnerable</strong></td>
<td>Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states: “The issues selected respond to the existing and emerging needs identified by the competent authorities of the two non-Annex I countries i.e. Egypt and Israel.” Greece’s biennial communication provides no information concerning future beneficiaries, vulnerability, or gender-responsiveness.</td>
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<td><strong>Additionality</strong></td>
<td>Information provided in the submission outlines that: “Financial support is determined as ‘new and additional’ if they are new sources or amounts since the last reporting period.” This definition of additionality does not comply with the spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, nor ensure that provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation of further resources</strong></td>
<td>Limited information is provided by Greece concerning mobilised private finance, and regarding financial flows consistent with low-emissions development and climate resilience.</td>
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Japan

Japan has not provided substantive, enhanced quantitative information within its biennial communication to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to past commitments, projects and programmes. Despite Japan reporting only 10% of the climate finance included in their Fourth Biennial Report as targeting adaptation, the biennial communication includes no formal commitment towards balanced support for adaptation and mitigation objectives. Due to the lack of enhanced information regarding future recipient countries to be financed, the extent to which LDCs and SIDS will be considered in Japan’s future climate finance is unclear. The submission does not enhance clarity surrounding a meaningful definition of additionality in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC.
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<td><strong>Future level of support:</strong> Does the Party provide information on projected levels of public financial resources for developing countries, including information on programmes and recipient countries?</td>
<td>Information provided in Japan’s biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance to be provided to developing countries. The limited information which is provided refers to a multiyear commitment to the GCF, and there is no additional detail concerning specific recipients and projects to be funded. The information can therefore not be considered as enhancing the predictability of climate finances for developing countries. Japan has not provided quantitative information offering a holistic picture of future projected climate finance provisions. As a result, clarity and detail regarding recipients of future finances, and the projects and programmes to be used to extend the support, is also lacking.</td>
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<td><strong>Balance between adaptation and mitigation support:</strong> Will the Party ensure a balance between support for adaptation and mitigation?</td>
<td>Regarding balance, the submission states: “Japan maintains more than 50% of our bilateral grant-based climate finance being allocated to adaptation support (in 2019, 50.4% of was allocated to adaptation).” However, a substantial portion of Japan’s support is provided as loans and as finance to multilateral institutions, and therefore this statement of balance does not refer to much of Japanese climate finance. There is no explicit statement ensuring that balanced support will be provided in the future. Of the climate finance reported in Japan’s Fourth Biennial Report, covering 2017 and 2018, only 10% targeted adaptation objectives.</td>
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<td><strong>The most vulnerable:</strong> Will the Party support country-driven strategies, prioritise the most vulnerable (LDCs and SIDS), and is there clarity on beneficiaries and gender-responsiveness?</td>
<td>Japan failed to provide clarity and detail regarding its future provisions of climate finance, instead focusing on case studies of future commitments. As a result, there is no information outlining how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of Japan’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 were approximately 14% and 1% respectively, both below developed country averages. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states that Japan ensures a “request based approach.” It continues: “Japan sets out a Country Assistance Policy for a respective recipient country, which lays out country-specific priorities and solutions for development cooperation, in close consultation with each country. These policies make it possible to appropriately capture and reflect their development needs, challenges and priorities.”</td>
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<td><strong>Additionality:</strong> Does the Party ensure additionality of climate finance?</td>
<td>The submission states: “In terms of ‘new and additional’ … Japan defines it as ‘newly committed or disbursed finance which contributes to climate change measures in developing countries during a given period of time.’ To make our expenditure for climate finance aligned with this definition, Japan ensures that double-counting is carefully prevented.” This definition of additionality does not comply with the spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, nor ensure that provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.</td>
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<td><strong>Mobilisation of further resources:</strong> Has the Party clear plans to mobilise further resources, and to help make finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate resilience?</td>
<td>Japan has not provided a clear plan to mobilise further private-sector resources, stating: “There is also limitation for the Government of Japan to provide, and thus officially report, the detailed information on the finance mobilised, largely due to confidentiality and competitive nature of business activities.”</td>
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Slovakia

Although Slovakia has provided information to outline its future developmental finance up to 2023, the submission does not provide substantive, enhanced quantitative information to ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries. The submission provides no annual or aggregate figures to outline future climate finance provisions, referring only to a multiyear commitment to the GCF. Slovakia’s biennial communication does not provide a clear commitment towards balanced provisions of adaptation and mitigation finance, or any references to vulnerability, LDCs, SIDS or the gender-responsiveness of its support. In addition, Slovakia has no policy regarding additionality in climate finance.
### Criteria

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Information provided in Japan’s biennial communication does not include detailed quantitative information on projected levels of public climate finance to be provided to developing countries. The limited information which is provided refers to a multiyear commitment to the GCF, and there is no additional detail concerning specific recipients and projects to be funded. The information can therefore not be considered as enhancing the predictability of climate finances for developing countries. Japan has not provided quantitative information offering a holistic picture of future projected climate finance provisions. As a result, clarity and detail regarding recipients of future finances, and the projects and programmes to be used to extend the support, is also lacking.

Regarding balance, the submission states: “Japan maintains more than 50% of our bilateral grant-based climate finance being allocated to adaptation support (in 2019, 50.4% of was allocated to adaptation).” However, a substantial portion of Japan’s support is provided as loans and as finance to multilateral institutions, and therefore this statement of balance does not refer to much of Japanese climate finance. There is no explicit statement ensuring that balanced support will be provided in the future. Of the climate finance reported in Japan’s Fourth Biennial Report, covering 2017 and 2018, only 10% targeted adaptation objectives.

Japan failed to provide clarity and detail regarding its future provisions of climate finance, instead focusing on case studies of future commitments. As a result, there is no information outlining how, and to what degree, future support will address the needs of the most vulnerable. The LDC and SIDS shares of Japan’s climate-related development finance reported to the OECD in 2017-2018 were approximately 14% and 1% respectively, both below developed country averages. Concerning developing country-driven strategies, the biennial communication states that Japan ensures a “request based approach.” It continues: “Japan sets out a Country Assistance Policy for a respective recipient country, which lays out country-specific priorities and solutions for development cooperation, in close consultation with each country. These policies make it possible to appropriately capture and reflect their development needs, challenges and priorities.”

The submission states: “In terms of ‘new and additional’ ... Japan defines it as ‘newly committed or disbursed finance which contributes to climate change measures in developing countries during a given period of time.’ To make our expenditure for climate finance aligned with this definition, Japan ensures that double-counting is carefully prevented.” This definition of additionality does not comply with the spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC, nor ensure that provisions of climate finance will not displace provisions of ODA.

Japan has not provided a clear plan to mobilise further private-sector resources, stating: “There is also limitation for the Government of Japan to provide, and thus officially report, the detailed information on the finance mobilised, largely due to confidentiality and competitive nature of business activities.”


UNFCCC. (2019). Decision 12/CMA.1: Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_03a01E.pdf


Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement

Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.

Decision 12/CMA.1

Identification of the information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,
Recalling Articles 4 and 11 of the Convention,
Also recalling Article 9, paragraphs 1–5, of the Paris Agreement,
Further recalling Articles 3, 4, 7, 10, 11 and 14 of the Paris Agreement,

Recalling decisions 3/CP.19, 1/CP.21, 13/CP.22 and 12/CP.23,
Underscoring the need for continued and enhanced international support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement,

1. Recognizes the importance of predictability and clarity of information on financial support for the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

2. Reiterates that developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties, and that other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis;

3. Underlines the importance of Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement on this matter;

4. Requests developed country Parties to submit the biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above and as specified in the annex starting in 2020;
5. Encourages other Parties providing resources to communicate biennially, as referred to in paragraph 2 above, on a voluntary basis;

6. Requests the secretariat to establish a dedicated online portal for posting and recording the biennial communications;

7. Also requests the secretariat to prepare a compilation and synthesis of the information included in the biennial communications, referred to in paragraph 2 above, starting in 2021, and to inform the global stocktake;

8. Further requests the secretariat to organize biennial in-session workshops beginning the year after the submission of the first biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above, and to prepare a summary report on each workshop;

9. Decides to consider the compilations and syntheses referred to in paragraph 7 above and the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 8 above starting at its fourth session (November 2021);

10. Also decides to convene a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance beginning in 2021, to be informed, inter alia, by the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraph 8 above and the biennial communications referred to in paragraph 2 above;

11. Requests the President of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to summarize the deliberations of the dialogue referred to in paragraph 10 above for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its succeeding session;

12. Invites the Conference of the Parties to consider the compilations and syntheses and the summary reports on the in-session workshops referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, respectively;

13. Decides to consider updating the types of information contained in the annex at its sixth session (2023) on the basis of Parties’ experience and lessons learned in the preparation of their biennial communications of indicative quantitative and qualitative information;

14. Takes note of the estimated budgetary implications of the activities to be undertaken by the secretariat pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraphs 6–8 and 10 above;

15. Requests that the actions of the secretariat called for in this decision be undertaken subject to the availability of financial resources.

Annex to decision 12/CMA.1

Types of information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement

Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Paris Agreement, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis. This should include:

(a) Enhanced information to increase clarity on the projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing countries, as available;

(b) Indicative quantitative and qualitative information on programmes, including projected levels, channels and instruments, as available;

(c) Information on policies and priorities, including regions and geography, recipient countries, beneficiaries, targeted groups, sectors and gender responsiveness;

(d) Information on purposes and types of support: mitigation, adaptation, crosscutting activities, technology transfer and capacity-building;

(e) Information on the factors that providers of climate finance look for in evaluating proposals, in order to help to inform developing countries;

(f) An indication of new and additional resources to be provided, and how it determines such resources as being new and additional;
(g) Information on national circumstances and limitations relevant to the provision of ex ante information;

(h) Information on relevant methodologies and assumptions used to project levels of climate finance;

(i) Information on challenges and barriers encountered in the past, lessons learned and measures taken to overcome them;

(j) Information on how Parties are aiming to ensure a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account the country-driven strategies and the needs and priorities of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation;

(k) Information on action and plans to mobilise additional climate finance as part of the global effort to mobilise climate finance from a wide variety of sources, including on the relationship between the public interventions to be used and the private finance mobilised;

(l) Information on how financial support effectively addresses the needs and priorities of developing country Parties and supports country-driven strategies;

(m) Information on how support provided and mobilised is targeted at helping developing countries in their efforts to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including by assisting them in efforts to make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development;

(n) Information on efforts to integrate climate change considerations, including resilience, into their development support;

(o) Information on how support to be provided to developing country Parties enhances their capacities.